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Abstract
Earlier work [LGBJS06] presents an automaton-based non-interference monitoring mechanism for se-
quential programs. This technical report extends this work to a concurrent setting. Monitored programs
are constituted of a set of threads running in parallel. Those threads run programs equivalent to those
of [LGBJS06] except for the inclusion of a synchronization command. The monitoring mechanism is still
based on a security automaton and on a combination of dynamic and static analyses. As in [LGBJS06],
the monitoring semantics sends abstractions of program events to the automaton, which uses the abstrac-
tions to track information flows and to control the execution by forbidding or editing dangerous actions.
All monitored executions are proved to be non-interfering (soundness).
1 Introduction
Similarly to [LGBJS06], the monitoring mechanism aims at forbidding the value of the private inputs to
influence the sequence of public outputs generated during an execution. In [LGBJS06], programs are de-
terministic and therefore always output the same sequence of public values. This is not anymore the case
in the multi-threaded setting. Hence, the monitor will not ensure that any execution started with the same
public inputs generates the same public output sequence — as this is the case in [LGBJS06]. Instead,
it ensures that, for any execution started with the same public inputs, there exists a thread interleaving
which generates a sequence of public output having, as prefix, the sequence of public outputs generated
so far by the currently monitored execution.
The language used in this report is equivalent the previous one except for the addition of a synchro-
nization command similar to the one used in [O’H04]. The main difference between those two works
lies in the semantics used. [LGBJS06] uses a big-step (or natural [Kah87]) semantics. Therefore it only
takes into account terminating executions. Use of a big-step semantics is not possible in the concurrent
settings. Hence, this report uses a small-step semantics. This modification allows the work presented in
this report to take into account non-terminating executions.
Section 2 starts by presenting the language used: its syntax and semantics. It introduces the princi-
ples used by the monitoring mechanism presented in this report. Section 3 defines formally the security
automaton which is at the heart of the monitoring mechanism. The following section characterizes the
monitoring semantics which links the monitoring automaton previously presented with the standard se-
mantics given in Section 2.2. Then, comes an example in Section 5 which examines the evolution of the
monitoring automaton during an example execution. Finally, before concluding in Section 7, soundness
is proved in Section 6.
2 Outline
2.1 The Language: Syntax
A concurrent program is a pool of threads (Θ); each of which contains a sequential program. Such a pool
is formally defined as a partial function from integers to sequential programs. Θ(i) is the ith sequential
program of the pool. The grammar of the sequential programs is given in Figure 1. In order to gain in
simplicity while describing the semantics, the grammar is split into four different blocks.
A sequential program (〈prog〉) is either a sequence of sequential programs or a command (〈com〉).
Actions (〈action〉) and control commands (〈control〉) are the only two types of commands. An action
is either an assignment of the value of an expression (〈expr〉) to a variable (〈ident〉), an output of the
value of an expression, or a skip (which does nothing). A control command is either: a conditional
executing one program — out of two — depending on the value of an expression, a loop executing
a program as long as the value of a given expression remains true, or a synchronization command
(with 〈ident-set〉 when 〈expr〉 do 〈prog〉 done). The latter is executed — i.e. the program it encompasses
is executed — only if no other thread owns one of the locks of the given set of variables (〈ident-set〉)
and the value of the expression (〈expr〉) is true. Otherwise, the thread executing this synchronization
command is blocked — i.e. it can not execute anything as long as the conditions are not fulfilled.
The syntax of the synchronization command comes from [Hoa72,O’H04,Bro04]. It has been chosen
for its ability to encode easily lots of different synchronization constructions. It allows the monitoring
mechanism to deal with only one synchronization construction while keeping the language expressive
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〈action〉 ::= 〈ident〉 := 〈expr〉
| output 〈expr〉
| skip
〈control〉 ::= if 〈expr〉 then 〈prog〉 else 〈prog〉 end
| while 〈expr〉 do 〈prog〉 done
| with 〈ident-set〉 when 〈expr〉 do 〈prog〉 done
〈com〉 ::= 〈action〉 | 〈control〉
〈prog〉 ::= 〈prog〉 ; 〈prog〉 | 〈com〉
Figure 1: Grammar of sequential programs in the concurrent setting
enough with regard to synchronization. Table 1 shows how to encode the Java’s “synchronized” com-
mand and standard semaphores using the synchronization command used in this report. The synchro-
synchronized(x){P} ≡ with x when true do P done
P(s) ≡ with s when s > 0 do s := s − 1 done
V(s) ≡ with s when true do s := s + 1 done
Table 1: Encoding of different synchronization commands
nization command complexifies the work of the monitor. However, when the expression enclosed in the
synchronization command is “true”, the monitor can allow it to appear at some program points it would
not allow otherwise. One important thing to be noticed in table 1 is that it is not infrequent for the expres-
sion in a synchronization command to simply be “true”. This explains why this special case is taken
into account in the monitoring mechanism exposed in this report.
2.2 The Language: Standard Semantics
During the execution, a thread does not necessarily contain a program as defined in Figure 1. In fact, it
is executing an execution statement (〈exec-stat〉) which is either empty (∅), a usual sequential program
(〈prog〉), an execution statement followed by a sequential program (〈exec-stat〉 ; 〈prog〉) or a locked state-
ment (⊙〈ident-set〉[〈exec-stat〉]) carrying additional information about the locks owned by this particular
thread. The grammar of execution statements is given in Figure 2 and is based on the grammar of sequen-
tial programs (Figure 1). A locked statement (⊙x̄[P]) is obtained after the execution of a synchronization
command (with x̄ when e do P done). When a thread Θ(i) executes a synchronization command, it ac-
quires the locks of the variables given in parameter (x̄). This information is registered somewhere in the
program state in order to be able to forbid other threads to acquire those locks as long as the thread Θ(i)
has not released them. However, the thread Θ(i) is still allowed to execute synchronization commands
on those locks — i.e. acquire again the same locks. The information needed to allow it is not registered
in the program state. The locks a given thread is allowed to acquire again are registered in its sequential
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〈exec-stat〉 ::= ∅
| 〈prog〉
| 〈exec-stat〉 ; 〈prog〉
| ⊙〈ident-set〉[〈exec-stat〉]
Figure 2: Grammar of sequential programs under execution
program itself by the substitution of the synchronization command just evaluated by a locked statement.
This locked statement contains the variables whose locks have just been acquired and the program to be
executed while holding those locks.
Due to the standard semantics used, a statement under execution (an execution statement) is a set —
potentially empty — of interwove locked statements followed by a usual sequential program. Formally,
an execution statement belongs to the language defined by the following expression:
(
⊙ 〈ident-set〉[
)n (
〈prog〉 + ∅
) ( (
; 〈prog〉
)?
]
)n (
; 〈prog〉
)?
Concurrent program semantics. A concurrent program under execution is a pool of execution state-
ments. One step of execution of a concurrent program consists in taking one execution step for one of
the execution statements of the thread pool. There is no constraint on which thread has to be evaluated.
The scheduler used for the thread interleaving is a purely random one. After each step of execution, the
next thread to execute is selected randomly among those which can take an execution step. Such a sched-
uler avoids timing covert channels which are based on the hypothesis that the attacker is able to guess
accurately in which order the scheduler will execute the different threads. When dealing with schedulers
which are not purely random, the solutions proposed in [RHNS06] should be applicable.
The semantics of unmonitored executions of concurrent programs (pool of threads) is given by the
following rule:
ı ∈ dom(Θ) 〈| ς ⊢ Θ(ı) |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′ ⊢ S ′ı |〉
〈| ς ⊢ Θ |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′ ⊢ Θ[ı 7→ S ′ı ] |〉
(ES-CONCUR)
Execution statement semantics. The semantics of concurrent programs is based on the semantics of
execution statements which is described in Figure 3. This latter semantics is based on rules written:
〈| ς ⊢ S |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′ ⊢ S ′ |〉
Those rules mean that in the execution state ς statement S evaluates to statement S ′ yielding state
ς′ and output sequence o. Let X be the domain of variable identifiers and D be the semantic domain of
values. An execution state ς is a pair (σ, λ) composed of a value store σ (X→ D) and a lock set λ (2X). σ
maps variable identifiers — or names — to their respective current value. The definition of value stores
is extended to expressions, so that σ(e) is the value of the expression e in a program state whose value
store is σ. λ is a set of variable identifiers. It corresponds to the set of variables whose lock is currently
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〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ x := e |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ[x 7→ σ(e)], λ) ⊢ ∅ |〉 (ES-ASSIGN)
〈| ς ⊢ output e |〉
σ(e)
−→
S
〈| ς ⊢ ∅ |〉 (ES-OUTPUT)
〈| ς ⊢ skip |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| ς ⊢ ∅ |〉 (ES-SKIP)
σ(e) = v
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ if e then S true else S false end |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ S v |〉
(ES-IF)
σ(e) = true
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ while e do S l done |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ S l ; while e do S l done |〉
(ES-WHILEtrue)
σ(e) = false
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ while e do S l done |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ skip |〉
(ES-WHILEfalse)
x̄ ∩ λ = ∅ σ(e) = true
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ with x̄ when e do S s done |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ ∪ x̄) ⊢ ⊙x̄[S s] |〉
(ES-WITH)
〈| ς ⊢ ∅ ; S t |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| ς ⊢ S t |〉
(ES-SEQaction)
〈| ς ⊢ S h |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′ ⊢ S h
′
|〉
〈| ς ⊢ S h ; S t |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′ ⊢ S h
′
; S t |〉
(ES-SEQbranch)
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ ⊙x̄[∅] |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ − x̄) ⊢ ∅ |〉
(ES-LOCKEDaction)
〈| (σ, λ − x̄) ⊢ S s |〉
o
−→
S
〈| (σ′, λ′) ⊢ S s
′
|〉
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ ⊙x̄[S s] |〉
o
−→
S
〈| (σ′, λ′ ∪ x̄) ⊢ ⊙x̄[S s
′
] |〉
(ES-LOCKEDseq)
Figure 3: Output semantics of sequential programs in the concurrent setting
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owned by a thread. An output sequence is a word in D⋆. It is either an empty sequence (written ǫ), a
single value (for example, σ(e)) or the concatenation of two other sequences (written o1 o2).
As shown by the rule (ES-WITH), if the prerequisites allow it, the execution of a synchronization
command yields an execution statement ⊙x̄[P] where x̄ is a set of variable identifiers. This rule states that
if the conditions hold, a synchronization command is replaced by the program P it includes. The current
thread will now own the locks of the variables belonging to x̄.
2.3 Monitoring Principles
The mechanism developed in this report is a monitor aiming at enforcing the confidentiality of private
data manipulated by any concurrent program. In order to achieve this goal, the monitoring mechanism is
designed to enforce a stronger property based on the notion of non-interference. The informal definition
of this notion [GM82] states that a program is “safe” if its private inputs have no influence on the observ-
able behavior of the program. This definition is stated at the level of the whole program. Unfortunately,
a monitor acts at the level of an execution and not of a whole program.
The remaining of the current section starts by giving some definitions which are then used to define
formally the notion of non-interference for executions. Subsequently, it provides a short description of the
way the monitor works. Finally, by commenting upon two examples of concurrent programs, it illustrates
some of the difficulties of monitoring non-interference and the solutions adopted.
A processing spans over a set of executions. In a sequential program, an execution is entirely defined
by a program and an initial state. In a concurrent setting, this is not the case if the term “execution” des-
ignates an entity defined by a program, an initial state and a precise output. In other terms, an execution
is considered to always generate the same output. In this report, an entity defined by a program and an
initial state is called a “processing”. A processing can generate different outputs depending on the thread
interleaving.
Definition 2.1 (Execution). An execution is the evaluation of precise program in a precise initial state
and following a precise thread interleaving. An execution always generates the same output.
Definition 2.2 (Processing). A processing is the evaluation of a precise program in a precise initial state.
A given processing can generate different outputs depending on the thread interleaving.
What is a non-interfering concurrent execution? An analysis is said to be sound with regard to a
given property. In this work, this property is non-interference. In order to prove soundness in section 6.1
and state formally the effect of the monitor, it is then required to first define precisely the non-interference
property in our concurrent setting. A program P is said to be non-interfering if and only if its private
inputs have no influence on the observable behavior of the program. This is usually characterized by
the following property: any two processing of P started with the same public inputs — but potentially
different private inputs — have the exact same observable behavior. It is then required to compare the
observable behavior of different processings. In this report, the observable behavior is the output sequence
generated. The output sequence generated by the evaluation of a given sequential program started in a
given state is unique. However, the output sequence generated by the evaluation of a given concurrent
program — a pool of sequential programs — started in a given state is not. For multi-threaded programs,
the output sequence generated by the processing of a given program started in a given state depend on
the thread interleaving which occurred during the evaluation. The definition of the observable behavior
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of a processing must then take into account all those possible output sequences. Additionally, as it is also
desired to take into account non-terminating executions, our definition of observable behavior must also
take into consideration the observable behavior of a processing at any step of its evaluation, not only the
final one. Definition 2.3 states that the observable behavior — or output sequences — of the processing
of a given concurrent program started in a given state is the set of all prefixes of any output sequence
which can be obtained by any thread interleaving.
Definition 2.3 (Observable behavior: O[[Θ]]sX).
For all semantics s, concurrent programs Θ, and states X:
O[[Θ]]sX = { o | ∃ X
′,Θ′ : 〈| X ⊢ Θ |〉
o
−→⋆s 〈| X
′ ⊢ Θ′ |〉 }
The monitoring mechanism does not determine if a program is or is not non-interfering, but if a
precise execution is or is not non-interfering. It has then to determine if, by looking at the current
output sequence, it is possible to differentiate the current execution from processings of the same program
started with the same public inputs but potentially different private inputs. This is possible only if the
output sequence, the observable behavior, of the current execution — which follows a precise thread
interleaving — of the program P can not be produced, for any thread interleaving, with an other initial
state X2 having the same public inputs. In other words, only if there exists an initial state X2 such that
the output sequence of the current execution does not belongs to O[[Θ]]sX2. Definition 2.5 characterizes
a non-interfering execution as an execution whose output sequence belongs to the observable behavior of
any processing of the same program and an initial state low equivalent (Definition 2.4) to the initial state
of the current execution.
Definition 2.4 (Low Equivalent States).
Two states X1, respectively X2, containing the value stores σ1, respectively σ2, are low equivalent with
regard to a set of variables V , written X1
V
= X2, if and only if the value of any variable belonging to V is
the same in σ1 and σ2. This is formally stated as follows:
X1
V
= X2 ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ V : σ1(x) = σ2(x)
Definition 2.5 (Non-interfering Execution).
The execution, with a semantics s, of a concurrent program Θ started in the initial state X1 and whose
output sequence is o is said to be non-interfering, written ni(Θ, s, X1, o), if and only if:
∀X2 : X1
S(Θ)c
= X2 ⇒ o ∈ O[[Θ]]sX2
How does the monitor enforce non-interference? As in [LGBJS06], the monitoring mechanism is
separated into two parts. The first element, described in Section 4, is a special semantics which delegates
the main job to a security automaton described in Section 3. The purpose of the special semantics
is to select and abstract the important events, with regard to non-interference, which occur during the
execution. The abstractions of those events are then sent to the security automaton. For each input
received, the automaton sends back to the semantics an output. Depending on those outputs received, the
special semantics modifies the normal execution of the program. The security automaton is in charge of
keeping track of the variables whose value carries variety — i.e. their value is influenced by the values of
the private inputs — and keeping track of variety in the context of execution — i.e. the program counter
— of each thread independently.
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With regard to synchronization commands, the solution adopted follows the standard solution found
in the literature [Sab01, ?]. Synchronizations inside the branch of a conditional whose branching condi-
tion is influenced by the private inputs are forbidden. However, it is impossible to stop the execution when
encountering a synchronization command inside a conditional whose branching condition carries variety.
Doing so would create a new covert channel leaking information to low-level users if a public output
was supposed to occur latter in the execution. One solution would consist in ignoring synchronization
commands in a context carrying variety. The drawback of this solution is to suppress synchronizations
that the programmer deemed wise to include. The solution adopted in this monitor is to force any syn-
chronization to occur outside any conditional whose branching expression carries variety. Whenever the
monitoring mechanism has to evaluate such a conditional, it executes the locking part of any synchro-
nization command appearing in any branch of the conditional.
The monitoring mechanism by the example. As with the monitor described in [LGBJS06], the secu-
rity automaton is unaware of the precise values of the variables. Consequently, it sometimes concludes
that variety is carried to a variable when it is not the case. A typical example is when a variable is as-
signed the same value in all branches of a conditional whose condition carries variety. In such a case, the
value of the assigned variable is always the same at the end of the conditional. However, this is out of the
scope of the proposed monitor and of the majority of works on non-interference.
Synchronization commands are inference prone. Figure 4 contains the code of a concurrent pro-
gram. It is composed of two threads, has a single private input (h) and uses an internal variable v which is
never output. The first thread (Figure 4(a)) takes the lock of the variable v and then output “a” followed
by “b” before releasing the lock. The second thread (Figure 4(b)) outputs “c”; then, if the private input
h is true, it tries to acquire the lock of v and release it immediately; finally, it outputs “d”. What can
1 with v when true do
2 output "a";
3 v := v + " f l i p ";
4 output "b"
5 done
(a) Thread Θ(1)
1 output "c";
2 i f h
3 then
4 with v when true do
5 v := v + " f l o p ";
6 done
7 e l s e sk ip
8 end;
9 output "d"
(b) Thread Θ(2)
Figure 4: Example of interference due to a lock
be deduced by a low-level user if it sees the output sequence “a c d b”? From the code of thread Θ(1),
it is possible to deduce that the first thread owns the lock of v at least from the time the program outputs
“a” until it outputs “b”. Consequently, as “c” and “d” are output between “a” and “b”, thread Θ(2) has
evaluated every command between the two outputs of “c” and “d” without needing to acquire the lock of
v. It is then easy, by looking at the code of Θ(2), to deduce that the private input h is false. The “bad”
flow from h to the output sequence is due to the synchronization commands on v.
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For some output sequences, as “a c d b”, it is possible to deduce that the synchronization command
in Θ(2) has not been executed, which in turn allows to deduce the value of h. It is worthwhile to notice
that, if not evaluating the synchronization command in Θ(2) can lead to the creation of a “bad” flow, this
is not the case for the evaluation of the synchronization command in Θ(2). If h is true, it is impossible
to deduce it from the output sequence. Indeed, what ever output sequence is generated when h is true,
there exists a thread interleaving when h is false generating the same output sequence.
To prevent the “bad” flow presented above, it is not a good idea to simply stop the execution whenever
a synchronization command has to be execute inside a conditional whose condition carries variety. In the
example presented, the synchronization command in Θ(2) is not executed. Stopping the program each
time the program has to evaluate a conditional, whose condition carries variety and which contains a
synchronization command, is not really appealing either. It does not either seem really wise to simply
ignore any synchronization command inside a conditional whose condition carries variety. There may
be a good reason for having one there: in the previous example, avoiding a concurrent write access to
the variable v. The solution adopted by the monitoring mechanism presented in this report consists in
acquiring all the locks of any synchronization command appearing in any branch of a conditional whose
condition carries variety before evaluating such a conditional. This mechanism prevent the program to
output “a c d b” even if h is false.
Be cagey with newsmongers. Figure 5(a) contains the code of a Very Important Program (VIP)
which has a single private input (h) and is run concurrently with the program in Figure 5(b). This latter
program is a newsmonger which outputs indefinitely and as fast as it can some of the variables manip-
ulated by the VIP (x and y). By itself, the VIP is not leaking any secret information. The main reason
being that is does not output anything. This program only sets x to 0, then y to 0 and finally resets both
to 1. However, depending on the value of its private input, it resets first x or y to 1. The interference
1 x := 0; y :=0;
2 i f h then
3 x := 1; y := 1
4 e l s e
5 y := 1; x := 1
6 end;
(a) VIP
1 whi le true do
2 output x;
3 output y;
4 done
(b) Newsmonger
Figure 5: Example of interference due to concurrent access
comes from the newsmonger. If it is lucky enough, and the VIP unlucky enough, the scheduler will let
the newsmonger take at least two steps, and so outputting x and y, while the VIP is in the middle of
resetting those variables to 1. It is then easy, depending on which one of x and y has been reset to 1 first,
to deduce the value of the private input h. The newsmonger is able to filch the value of the private input
of an unmonitored execution of the VIP. Less intuitively, it is also possible, if the scheduler gives a high
priority to the newsmonger, to deduce the value of h if the execution is supervised by a monitor which
takes into account indirect flows created by an assignment only when this assignment is evaluated. The
reason is that, in between the two assignments resetting x and y to 1, those two variables do not have the
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same security level. Consequently, such a “bad” monitor does not act the same way for the commands
“output x” and “output y” if only one of x and y has been reset to 1.
The monitoring mechanism proposed in this report takes into account an indirect flow as soon as the
conditional which is the source of this flow is executed. For any execution of the VIP, this means that x
and y get a high security level at the same time — when the conditional branching on h is first evaluated.
Therefore, the monitor has the same behavior for the two commands “output x” and “output y”. The
newsmonger is then unable to filch the VIP’s secret.
Section 5 follows precisely the behavior of the monitoring mechanism on an example. Before that, the
next two sections give a formal definition of the monitoring mechanism: first of the security automaton
used, and then of the special semantics communicating with this automaton.
3 The Monitoring Automaton
This section describes the security automaton used in the monitoring mechanism. It is in charge of
tracking the information flows and controlling the execution in order to enforce non-interference. The
semantics described in section 4 sends abstractions of the execution events to this automaton. In turn,
the monitoring automaton sends back directions to the semantics to control the execution, thus enforcing
non-interference.
Notations. For any set S, let 2S be the power set of S. For any set A, let A⋆ be the set of all strings over
the alphabet A. For any sequential program P whose variables belongs to X, let the set of private input
variables be S(P) (S(P) ⊆ X).
The monitoring automaton is formally defined using multisets among others. The following defines
notations and operations over multisets as used in this report1.
Within set theory, a multiset can be formally defined as a pair (A,m) where A is some set and
m : A→ N is a function from A to the set N of [. . . ] natural numbers. The set A is called the
underlying set of elements. For each a in A the multiplicity (that is, number of occurrences)
of a is the number m(a).
In the work proposed here, multisets are only represented by there underlying function. In the following,
if m denotes a multiset — which is known from the context — it is the multiset (M,m) where M is the
domain of m — written dom(m). In consequence, m must be total over the underlying set of elements
of the bag. However, for simplicity reasons, even if x does not belongs to the domain of the underlying
function m, m(x) is considered to be defined and equal to 0. The empty multiset, written ∅, is the multiset
whose underlying function has an empty domain.
1The definitions are based on those that can be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiset.
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Operations on multisets are defined as follows. For any multisets m, n and f :
m ⊎ n = f where dom( f ) = dom(m) ∪ dom(n) and f (x) = m(x) + n(x)
m ∪ n = f where dom( f ) = dom(m) ∩ dom(n) and f (x) = max(m(x), n(x))
m ∩ n = f where dom( f ) = dom(m) ∩ dom(n) and f (x) = min(m(x), n(x))
m \ n = f where f (x) = max(0,m(x) − n(x))
m = n ≡ ∀x ∈ (dom(m) ∪ dom(n)) : m(x) = n(x)
m ⊆ n ≡ ∀x ∈ dom(m) : m(x) ≤ n(x)
If one of those operations involve a multiset and a set S, this set is considered as the multiset whose
underlying set of elements is S and whose elements have a multiplicity of 1.
Formal definition of the monitoring automaton for sequential programs. Preceding sections present
the monitoring mechanism as if it is using a single monitoring automaton. This is not exactly true, nei-
ther false. The monitoring automaton of concurrent programs is defined by first defining a monitoring
automaton for sequential programs. A concurrent program is a pool of threads each one of which contains
a single sequential program. Each time the “automaton” of the concurrent program Θ receives an input
φ, generated by an evaluation step in a sequential program Θ(i), a state for the monitoring automaton of
Θ(i) is extracted from the state of the monitoring automaton of Θ. Then, the monitoring automaton for
sequential programs take a transition on input φ generating output ψ. Finally, the state of the monitoring
automaton of Θ is updated using the new state returned by the transition of the monitoring automaton for
sequential programs and the output ψ is sent back to the monitoring semantics.
The automaton enforcing non-interference for the sequential program P is the tupleA(P) = (Q,Φ,Ψ, δ, q0)
where:
• Q is a set of states (Q = 2X × (X→ N) × 2X × {⊤,⊥}⋆);
• Φ is the input alphabet, constituted of abstractions of a subset of program events, specified below;
• Ψ is the output alphabet, constituted of execution controlling commands, specified below;
• δ is a transition function (Q × Φ) −→ (Ψ × Q);
• q0, an element of Q, is the start state (q0 = (S(P), ∅, ∅, ǫ)).
The automaton states. An automaton state is a quadruplet (V,W, L,w) composed of two sets (V
and L) of variables belonging to X, a multiset (W) of variables belonging to X and a word (w) belonging
to a language whose alphabet is {⊤,⊥}. At any step of the execution, V contains all the variables which
may carry variety — i.e. whose values may have been influenced by the initial values of the secret input
variables (S(P)). L contains the variables whose lock may be owned by a thread at an “equivalent” step
of an execution of the same program started with the same public inputs but potentially different private
inputs. L is the part of the automaton state which protects secret data against attacks similar to the one
described in the example about synchronization commands on page 8. W contains at least once each
pair of variables whose difference in the order of assignment may leak secret information. W is the
part of the automaton state which protects secret data against attacks similar to the one described in the
newsmonger’s example on page 9. w, called a branching context, tracks variety in the context of the
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execution with regard to previous branching commands. The context consists in the level of variety the
conditions of the previous, but still active, branching commands. If w contains ⊤, then the statement
executed was initially a branch of a conditional whose test may have been influenced by the initial values
of S(P). Hence this statement may not be executed with a different choice of initial values for the private
input variables (S(P)).
Automaton inputs. The input alphabet of the automaton (Φ) contains abstractions of the events,
interesting for non-interference monitoring, that can occur during an execution. The alphabet Φ consists
of the following:
“branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu)” is generated each time a conditional is evaluated. λ is the set of variables whose
lock is currently owned by a thread, e is the expression whose value determines the branch which
is executed, Pe is the branch which will be executed, and Pu is the branch which will not be
executed. For example, before evaluation of “if x > 10 then S 1 else S 2 end” with ((σ, λ), q) being
the monitored execution state, the input “branch(λ, x > 10, S 1, S 2)” is sent to the monitoring
automaton if x is greater than 10.
“merge(Pe, Pu)” is generated each time a conditional has been fully evaluated. Pe is the branch which
has been executed, and Pu is the branch which has not been executed. For example, after evaluation
of “if x > 10 then S 1 else S 2 end”, the input “merge(S 1, S 2)” is sent to the monitoring automaton.
“sync(x̄, e)” is generated before any synchronization command. For example, with x, b when b do S s done
generates the input “sync({x, b}, b)”.
any atomic action of the language (assignment, skip or output statement). Any action which has to be
evaluated is first sent to the automaton for validation before its execution.
Automaton outputs. The automaton outputs control the behavior of the monitoring semantics.
They are sent back from the automaton to the monitoring semantics in order to control the execution.
The output alphabet (Ψ) is composed of the following:
“OK” is used whenever the monitoring automaton allows an execution step that it could have altered or
denied.
“NO” is used whenever the monitoring automaton forbids the execution of an action. This action is
simply skipped by the monitored execution.
any atomic action of the language. This is the answer of the monitoring automaton whenever another
action than the current one has to be executed.
Compared to [LGBJS06], the output “ACK” has disappeared. The reason is that the automaton can block
the execution on any non-action commands. In [LGBJS06], some inputs do not require intervention of
the automaton on the execution. Their only goal is to help the automaton track useful information. There
is not anymore such automaton inputs for this report.
12
Automaton transitions. Figure 6 specifies the transition function of the automaton. A transition
rule is written:
(q, φ)
ψ
−→ q′
It reads as follows: in the state q, on reception of the input φ, the automaton moves to state q′ and outputs
ψ. Let FV(e) be the set of variables occurring in e. For example, FV(x + y) returns the set {x, y}.
Let modify(S ) be the set of all variables whose value may be modified by an execution of S . This
function is used in order to take into account the implicit indirect flows created when a conditional whose
condition carries variety is evaluated. A formal definition of this function follows:
modify(x := e) = {x}
modify(output e) = ∅
modify(skip) = ∅
modify(S 1 ; S 2) = modify(S 1) ∪modify(S 2)
modify(if e then S 1 else S 2 end) = modify(S 1) ∪modify(S 2)
modify(while e do S done) = modify(S )
modify(with x̄ when e do S done) = modify(S )
Let needs(S ) be the set of all variables whose lock may required in order to execute S . This function
is used by the monitoring automaton in order to “virtually” acquire all the locks which may be needed for
the complete evaluation of a conditional whose condition carries variety. Those locks are not acquired
by the current thread. They will be only when their corresponding synchronization command will be
executed. However, the monitoring automaton registers them in his state. Before allowing the evaluation
of a conditional whose condition carries variety, the automaton checks that there is no needed lock which
is already registered in the automaton state for an other thread. This is done in order to make sure that
the evaluation of the branch designated by the condition — which carries variety — can not be stopped
because of a needed lock which would be owned by an other thread. A formal definition of needs(S )
follows:
needs(x := e) = ∅
needs(output e) = ∅
needs(skip) = ∅
needs(S 1 ; S 2) = needs(S 1) ∪ needs(S 2)
needs(if e then S 1 else S 2 end) = needs(S 1) ∪ needs(S 2)
needs(while e do S done) = needs(S )
needs(with x̄ when e do S done) = x̄ ∪ needs(S )
Finally, let stops(S ) be true if the execution of S may be stopped: either by looping or waiting on a
synchronization command. This function is used by the automaton when finishing the complete evalu-
ation of some conditionals whose condition carries variety. This is done in order to prevent an attacker
to learn some secret information by observing from the source code that, in under some conditions, one
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of the branches of a conditional, whose condition carries variety, can not terminate. stops(S ) is formally
defined as follows:
stops(x := e) = f alse
stops(output e) = f alse
stops(skip) = f alse
stops(S 1 ; S 2) = stops(S 1) ∨ stops(S 2)
stops(if e then S 1 else S 2 end) = stops(S 1) ∨ stops(S 2)
stops(while e do S done) ≡ e , false
stops(with x̄ when e do S done) ≡ e , true
Figure 6 shows that the automaton forbids (NO) or edits (output θ) only executions of output state-
ments. For other inputs, it either allows the evaluation of the statement — a transition exists for the
current input in the current state — or forces the monitoring semantics to take an execution step for
another thread — there is no transition for the current input in the current state. Whenever a transition
occurs, the automaton tracks, in the set V , the variables that may contain secret information — have va-
riety —; it registers, in W, the variables whose variety may evolve differently due to a conditional whose
condition carries variety; it tracks, in L, the variables whose lock status may carry variety; and it tracks,
in w, the variety of the branching conditions.
Inputs “branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu)” are generated at entry point of conditionals. On reception of such in-
puts in state ((V,W, L,w)), if the conditional to be evaluated belongs to a branch of a conditional whose
condition carries variety — w does not belongs to {⊥}⋆, the automaton simply pushes ⊥ at the end of w.
Otherwise, the automaton checks if the branching condition (e) carries variety — i.e. if its value might be
influenced by the initial values of S(P). To do so, it computes the intersection of the variables appearing
in e with the set V . If the intersection is empty, then the condition of the branching statement does not
carry variety. In that case, the automaton simply pushes ⊥ at the end of w. If the intersection is not empty,
then the value of e may be influenced by the initial values of S(P). If this is the case then the automaton
checks if the execution can proceed without being stopped by a lock that it can not acquire. To do so, it
verifies that there is no needed lock which is already owned by another thread or has already been booked
previously for the execution of a conditional of an other thread (l̃ ∩ (λ ∪ L) = ∅). If all needed locks are
available, the automaton pushes ⊤ at the end of w, registers the needed locks in the new automaton state
and deals with indirect flows. This is done by adding all variables which may be assigned to in one of the
branches of the conditional into the set of variables potentially carrying variety (V) and into the multiset
of variables whose order of assignment may carry variety (W).
Whenever execution exits a branch — which is a member of a conditional c — the input “merge(Pe, Pu)”
is sent to the automaton. On reception of such input, the automaton checks if other private inputs may
have induced the execution of the conditional to be stopped. This is the case if the condition of the con-
ditional c carries variety — w ends with ⊤— and the function stops() concludes that at least one of the
branches of c can get stuck. If that is not the case, the automaton allows the evaluation step and the last
letter of w is removed. As any such input matches a previous input “branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu)” — generated
by the same conditional c — which adds a letter to the end of w, the effect of “merge(Pe, Pu)” restores the
context to its state before the conditional was processed. Additionally, if c is the first conditional whose
condition carries variety in this sequential program, the variables added into the multiset W for protection
while executing c are removed from the multiset.
Before executing any synchronization command, the monitoring semantics sends to the automaton
14
((V,W, L,w), branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu))
OK
−−→ (V,W, L,w⊥) iff
{
FV(e) ∩ V = ∅
∨ w < {⊥}⋆
(T-BRANCH-low)
((V,W, L,w), branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu))
OK
−−→ (V ∪ ṽ,W ⊎ ṽ, L ∪ l̃,w⊤)
with
{
ṽ = modify(Pe) ∪modify(Pu)
l̃ = needs(Pe) ∪ needs(Pu)
iff









FV(e) ∩ V , ∅
∧ w ∈ {⊥}⋆
∧ l̃ ∩ (λ ∪ L) = ∅
(T-BRANCH-high)
((V,W, L,w⊥), merge(Pe, Pu))
OK
−−→ (V,W, L,w) (T-MERGE-low)
((V,W, L,w⊤), merge(Pe, Pu))
OK
−−→ (V,W \ ṽ, L \ l̃,w)
with
{
ṽ = modify(Pe) ∪modify(Pu)
l̃ = needs(Pe) ∪ needs(Pu)
iff
{
¬stops(Pe)
∧ ¬stops(Pu)
(T-MERGE-high)
((V,W, L,w), sync(x̄, e))
OK
−−→ (V,W, L,w) iff









FV(e) ∩ V = ∅
∧ ( w < {⊥}⋆
∨ x̄ ∩ L = ∅ )
(T-SYNC)
(q, skip)
OK
−−→ q (T-SKIP)
((V,W, L,w), x := e)
OK
−−→ (V ∪ {x},W, L,w) iff
{
FV(e) ∩ V , ∅
∨ x ∈ W
(T-ASSIGN-sec)
((V,W, L,w), x := e)
OK
−−→ (V \ {x},W, L,w) iff
{
FV(e) ∩ V = ∅
∧ x < W
(T-ASSIGN-pub)
((V,W, L,w), output e)
OK
−−→ (V,W, L,w) iff w ∈ {⊥}
⋆ and FV(e) ∩ V = ∅ (T-OUTPUT-ok)
((V,W, L,w), output e)
output δ
−−−−−−→ (V,W, L,w) iff w ∈ {⊥}
⋆ and FV(e) ∩ V , ∅ (T-OUTPUT-def)
((V,W, L,w), output e)
NO
−−→ (V,W, L,w) iff w < {⊥}
⋆ (T-OUTPUT-no)
Figure 6: Transition function of the monitoring automata
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an input of type “sync(x̄, e)”. The automaton allows the evaluation step only if the expression in the
synchronization command does not carry variety and either the needed locks are not reserved (x̄∩ L = ∅)
or the automaton has already booked those locks for the current thread.
Atomic actions (assignment, skip or output) are sent to the automaton for validation before their
execution. The atomic action skip is considered safe because the non-interference definition considered
in this work is not time sensitive. Hence the automaton always authorizes its execution by outputting OK.
When executing an assignment (x := e), two types of flows are created. The first is a direct flow from
e to x. The second flow is an explicit indirect flow from the context of execution to x. For example, the
execution of the assignment in “if b then x := y else skip end” creates such a flow from b to x. Both forms
of flows are always created when an assignment is executed. Explicit indirect flows are indirect flows
and so are already taken care for by the processing of inputs of type “branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu)”. Therefore,
on such input, the automaton deals only with direct flows. Hence, on input x := e, the automaton checks
if the value of e carries variety. This is the case only if FV(e) and V are not disjoint. If the value of e is
influenced by the initial values ofS(P) then at least one of the variables appearing in e has been influenced
by S(P). Such variables are members of V . Let (V ′,W ′, L′,w′) be the new automaton state after the
transition. If the origin of the direct flow is influenced by the initial values of S(P), then x (the variable
modified) is added to V: V ′ = V ∪ {x}. Otherwise x receives a new value which is not influenced by S(P).
In that case, V ′ equals V \ {x}. This makes the mechanism flow-sensitive. Other parts of the automaton
state do not change: W ′ = W, L′ = L and w′ = w. There is an exception to this rule. If there exists an
indirect flow from the condition carrying variety of a still active conditional then the variable assigned to
must not be removed from the set of variables carrying variety. If such an indirect flow exists then the
assigned variable is still under the protection acquired when the corresponding “branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu)”
input has been processed (x ∈ W). In that case, the variable is left in the set V .
The rules for the automata input, “output e,” prevent bad flows through two different channels. The
first one is the actual content of what is output. In a public context, (w ∈ {⊥}⋆), if the program tries to
output a secret (i.e., the intersection of V and the variables in e is not empty), then the value of the output
is replaced by a default value. This value can be a message informing the user that, for security reasons,
the output has been denied. To do so, the automaton outputs a new output statement to execute in place of
the current one. The second channel is the generation of an output by itself. This channel exists because,
depending on the path followed, some outputs may or may not be executed. Hence, if the automaton
detects that this output may not be executed with different values for S(P) (the context carries variety)
then any output must be forbidden; and the automaton outputs NO.
The automaton states for concurrent programs. As explained above, the monitoring automaton
for concurrent program is based on the monitoring automaton for sequential programs. Monitoring au-
tomaton states for concurrent programs are similar to the automaton states for sequential programs. An
automaton state is a quadruplet (Q = (V,W, L,w)) which belongs to the following set:
2X × (X→ N) × 2X × (N→ {⊤,⊥}⋆)
V , W and L are directly inherited from automaton states for sequential programs. w is a function mapping
thread identifiers to their respective branching context (as defined for sequential programs).
The functions used to extract, respectively update, the automaton state for a given thread from, re-
spectively into, the automaton state of the concurrent program are defined below.
extractStates((V,W, L,w), ı) = (V,W, L,w(ı)) (1)
updateStates((V,W, L,w), ı, (V ′,W ′, L′,w′)) = (V ′,W ′, L′,w[ı 7→ w′]) (2)
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The current section defines formally the monitoring automaton. Among others, it defines an input
alphabet and an output alphabet which serve to communicate with the monitoring semantics. This se-
mantics, described in the next section, is in charge of the concrete evaluation of the concurrent program
under the supervision of the monitoring automaton.
4 The Monitoring Semantics
During a monitored execution, a thread contains a monitored statement (〈monit-stat〉) which is hihgly
similar to execution statements described in Figure 2. The only difference is the addition of branched
statements (⊗(〈prog〉, 〈prog〉)[〈monit-stat〉]). The statement ⊗(Pe, Pa)[S ] states that statement S is a par-
tial execution of Pe — i.e. S is the result of the application of some execution steps to Pe — and that Pe is
the executed branch of a conditional whose un-executed branch is Pa. The rule (EM-IF) of Figure 8 may
give a good intuition of the meaning of this statement. The grammar of monitored statements is given in
Figure 7 and is based on the grammar of sequential programs (Figure 1).
〈monit-stat〉 ::= ∅
| 〈prog〉
| 〈monit-stat〉 ; 〈prog〉
| ⊙〈ident-set〉[〈monit-stat〉]
| ⊗(〈prog〉, 〈prog〉)[〈monit-stat〉]
Figure 7: Grammar of sequential programs under monitored execution
A statement under monitored execution is a set — potentially empty — of interwove locked state-
ments and branched statements followed by a usual sequential program. Formally, a monitored statement
belongs to the language defined by the following expression:
(
⊙ 〈ident-set〉[ + ⊗ (〈prog〉, 〈prog〉)[
)n (
〈prog〉 + ∅
) ( (
; 〈prog〉
)?
]
)n (
; 〈prog〉
)?
Thread semantics. The monitoring semantics of concurrent programs is based on the semantics of
monitored statements which is described in Figure 8. This semantics is based on rules written:
〈| ζ  S |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′  S ′ |〉
The previous rule reads as follows: in monitored execution state ζ, monitored statements S evaluates to
S ′ yielding state ζ′ and output sequence o. A monitored execution state ζ is a pair (ς, q) composed of an
execution state (ς) of the standard semantics and a monitoring automaton state (q).
Executions of monitored statements interact with the security automaton by sending it an input and
receiving back an output. For simplicity, we assume that the automaton inputs are generated dynamically
by the interpreter that implements the semantics in Figure 3 (But a compiler can easily embed such events
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into a program’s compiled code). In the rules of the semantics, this is done using automaton transitions
written:
(q, φ)
ψ
−→ q′
This transition states that, in state q, if the automaton receives the input φ then it yields output ψ and the
new automaton state is q′. The semantics of monitored statements also makes use of the semantics of
execution statements — the standard semantics — for the evaluation of actions (assignments, outputs, or
skip statements). Those semantics can be distinguished by their name appearing on the bottom right of
the arrow.
There are three rules for atomic actions: skip, x := e and output e. There is one rule for each possible
automaton answer to the action executed. Either the automaton authorizes the execution (OK), denies the
execution (NO), or replaces the action by another one. The rules use the standard semantics (Figure 3)
when an action must be executed. In the case where the execution is denied, the evaluation omits the
current action (as if the action was ”skip”). For the case where, on reception of input A, the monitoring
automaton returns A′, the monitoring semantics executes A′ instead of A. Note from Figure 6, that A′ can
only be the action that outputs the default value (output θ).
For conditionals, the evaluation begins by sending to the automaton the input “branch(λ, e, Pe, Pu)”
where λ is the set of variables whose lock is currently owned by a thread, e is the test of the conditional,
Pe is the “branch” which will be executed and Pu is the “branch” which will not be executed. After
the evaluation step, the monitored execution state is updated with the automaton state returned by the
monitoring automaton and the conditional evaluated is replaced by the branch to execute.
A synchronization command “with x̄ when e do Ps done” can be evaluated only if the needed locks x̄
are not currently owned by another thread, the condition e is true and the monitoring automaton allows the
evaluation on reception of the input “sync(x̄, e)”. After the evaluation step, the needed locks are added to
the set of locks currently owned by a thread, the automaton state is updated and the command is replaced
by a locked statement indicating that the locks x̄ are owned by the current thread for the evaluation of the
program Ps.
Evaluating a branched statements (⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b]) is equivalent to evaluating the enclosed statement
(S b) as long as this statement is not completely evaluated. If the evaluation of S b is completed then the
input “merge(Pe, Pu)” is sent to the automaton and the evaluation of the thread can proceed only if the
automaton allows it.
In order to take one evaluation step of a locked statement (⊙x̄[S s]), the set of locks x̄ is temporarily
removed from the set of owned locks in the execution state. Then, one evaluation step is taken for S s
and the locks x̄ are put back in the set of owned locks in the execution state if the evaluation of S s is not
completed.
Concurrent program semantics. As explained in Section 3, the automaton states for monitoring the
execution of a single thread are different from the states for monitoring concurrent programs. The de-
scription of automaton states for monitoring concurrent programs is given in Section 3. Let Q stands for
the state of the security automaton for concurrent programs. The monitoring semantics uses two functions
for converting between automaton states for thread and automaton states for concurrent programs. Those
functions are described in Section 3. Succinctly, extractState(Q, ı) is the automaton state for monitoring
the ıth thread of the concurrent program whose automaton state is Q. updateStates(Q, ı, q) is an automaton
state for concurrent program equivalent to Q except for the ıth thread. Information concerning this thread
has been updated using the information contained in the automaton state for thread monitoring q. The
semantics of monitored executions of concurrent programs is given by the following rule:
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(q, A)
OK
−−→ q′ 〈| ς ⊢ A |〉
o
−→s 〈| ς
′ ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| (ς, q)  A |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς′, q′)  ∅ |〉
(EM-OK)
(q, A)
A′
−→ q′ 〈| ς ⊢ A′ |〉
o
−→s 〈| ς
′ ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| (ς, q)  A |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς′, q′)  ∅ |〉
(EM-EDIT)
(q, A)
NO
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q)  A |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′)  ∅ |〉
(EM-NO)
σ(e) = v (q, branch(λ, e, Pv, P¬v))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q)  if e then Ptrue else Pfalse end |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′)  ⊗(Pv, P¬v)[Pv] |〉
(EM-IF)
Ptrue = Pl ; while e do Pl done Pfalse = skip
σ(e) = v (q, branch(λ, e, Pv, P¬v))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q)  while e do Pl done |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′)  ⊗(Pv, P¬v)[Pv] |〉
(EM-WHILE)
x̄ ∩ λ = ∅ σ(e) = true (q, sync(x̄, e))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| ((σ, λ), q)  with x̄ when e do Ps done |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| ((σ, λ ∪ x̄), q′)  ⊙x̄[Ps] |〉
(EM-WITH)
〈| ζ  ∅ ; S t |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| ζ  S t |〉
(EM-SEQexit)
〈| ζ  S h |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′  S h
′
|〉
〈| ζ  S h ; S t |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′  S h
′
; S t |〉
(EM-SEQstep)
(q, merge(Pe, Pu))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q)  ⊗(Pe, Pu)[∅] |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′)  ∅ |〉
(EM-BRANCHexit)
S b , ∅ 〈| ζ  S b |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′  S b
′
|〉
〈| ζ  ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b] |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′  ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b
′
] |〉
(EM-BRANCHstep)
〈| ((σ, λ), q)  ⊙x̄[∅] |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| ((σ, λ \ x̄), q)  ∅ |〉
(EM-LOCKEDexit)
S s , ∅ 〈| ((σ, λ \ x̄), q)  S s |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′), q′)  S s
′
|〉
〈| ((σ, λ), q)  ⊙x̄[S s] |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′ ∪ x̄), q′)  ⊙x̄[S s
′
] |〉
(EM-LOCKEDstep)
Figure 8: Semantics combining standard small step semantics and the monitoring automaton
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ı ∈ dom(Θ)
〈| (ς, extractState(Q, ı))  Θ(ı) |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς′, q)  S ′ı |〉
〈| (ς, Q)  Θ |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς′, updateStates(Q, ı, q))  Θ[ı 7→ S ′ı ] |〉
(EM-CONCUR)
Initial state of a monitored concurrent execution. There is a unique initial state for monitoring the
execution of a given concurrent program with a given initial value store. Definition 4.1 states that the
initial state of the monitored execution of a concurrent program is the monitoring execution state whose
initial value store is the given one, set of owned lock is empty and automaton state designates the value
of the private inputs as the only elements carrying variety.
Definition 4.1 (Initial State of Monitored Executions).
For all concurrent programs Θ and value stores σ, let ζI
Θ,σ
be the initial state of the monitored execution
of Θ with initial value store σ. ζI
Θ,σ
is equal to ((σ, ∅), (S(Θ), ∅, ∅, {i 7→ ǫ|i ∈ dom(Θ)})).
5 Example of monitored execution
Figure 9 is an example of a concurrent program having two threads. Figure 9(a) contains the code of
the sequential program of the first thread and Figure 9(b) contains the code of the second thread. This
program has only one private input (h) and no public input. It uses three internal variables (v, b and x).
Both threads attempt to write in the variable v. Both assignments to v are protected by a synchronization
on the lock of v. Additionally, before assigning a value to v, the second thread waits for b to be true.
After assigning a value to v, the second thread outputs twice the value of x. The first thread, depending
on the value of the private input h, either assigns a value to x and outputs “a”, or assign a value to v. The
last command evaluated by the first thread resets the value of x to 0.
1 i f h then
2 x := 1;
3 output "a"
4 e l s e
5 with v when true do
6 v := v - 1;
7 done
8 end;
9 x := 0
(a) Thread Θ(1)
1 with v when b do
2 v := v + 1;
3 done;
4 output x;
5 output x
(b) Thread Θ(2)
Figure 9: Another concurrent program
Table 2 shows the evolution of the monitoring automaton for an execution of the program of Figure 9.
This execution starts in an initial state where the private input h is true. As the program has only one
private input (h) and two threads, the initial state of the monitoring automaton is the following one:
({h}, ∅, ∅, [1 7→ ǫ, 2 7→ ǫ])
20
Execution’s steps are numbered on the left. The first column of the table shows the value of the program
counters of the two threads. “ı ⊲ ” and “ı ◮ ” indicates that the program counter of the ıth thread maps to
the line . 0 is used for  when the execution of the thread is completed. ◮ is used to designate the thread
which will be evaluated at this execution step. The following column contains the event abstractions
which are sent by the semantics to the automaton. In this column, Pt stands for the lines 2 to 3 of the
first thread and P f stands for the lines 5 to 7 of the first thread. Then comes the answer of the automaton
letting the semantics know what to do. The 4th column gives the new state of the automaton after the
transition triggered by the automaton input shown on the same line. Consequently, the automaton state
before the transition is the one of the preceding line. Finally, the last column lists the actions which are
really evaluated by this monitored execution of the program.
Program Automaton: Actions
counters input output new state executed
1 1 ⊲ 1 2 ◮ 1 sync({v}, b) OK ({h} , ∅ , {v}, [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ])
2 1 ⊲ 1 2 ◮ 2 v := v + 1 OK ({h} , ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ]) v := v + 1
3 1 ◮ 1 2 ⊲ 4 branch(∅, h, Pt, P f ) OK ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ])
4 1 ⊲ 2 2 ◮ 4 output x output θ ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ]) output θ
5 1 ◮ 2 2 ⊲ 5 x := 1 OK ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ]) x := 1
6 1 ◮ 3 2 ⊲ 5 output ”a” NO ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ])
7 1 ◮ 8 2 ⊲ 5 merge(Pt, P f ) OK ({h, x, v}, ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ])
8 1 ◮ 9 2 ⊲ 5 x := 0 OK ({h, v} , ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ]) x := 0
9 1 ⊲ 0 2 ◮ 5 output x OK ({h, v} , ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ]) output x
Table 2: Example of the automaton evolution during an execution.
At the execution step 2, the only thread which can be executed is the second one. The reason is that
at the preceding step, the second thread took the lock of v. The first command to be executed by the
first thread is a conditional containing a synchronization command on v. Therefore, to execute the first
thread, the monitor requires this thread to be able to acquire the lock of v. This is impossible as this lock
is owned by the second thread. Hence, even if the branch to be executed is not the one containing the
synchronization command, the program can not evaluate the conditional of the first thread. An example
of the reason of this rule has been given on page 8.
Execution step 3 evaluates the conditional of the first thread. This conditional, whose condition
carries variety, contains an assignment to x in one branch and an assignment to v in the other one. In
order to prevent an attack similar to the one exposed on page 9, the monitor considers them as carrying
variety straight away, even if there respective assignments have not been evaluated yet. This is done by
adding them to the first element of the new automaton state. A clever newsmonger — that special type
of attacker thread — may try to dupe the monitor into believing that those variables do not carry variety
anymore by resetting their value. To prevent it, the monitor also registers that those variables carry variety
because of the processing of a conditional. This is done by adding them into the multiset — or bag —
which is the second element of the new state. Variables x and v will appear at least once in this multiset
as long as the processing of the conditional which added them into it is not over. Furthermore, as stated
in the explanation of step 2, the first thread acquires the lock of v because the conditional processed at
this step is conditioned by an expression carrying variety and contains a synchronization command on v
in one of its branches. Finally, the monitor registers the new context of execution — reflecting the fact
that the branch that will be executed depend on an expression carrying variety — by adding ⊤ to the word
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associated with the identifier of the first thread in the forth element of the new state.
In step 4 of the execution, the second thread attempts to output the value of x. This variables belongs
to the first element of the automaton state before the transition. This means that the value of x may carry
variety. Therefore, the monitor replace the value of x by a default value. It allows the user to know that an
output as been prevented for security reasons. Five steps latter, at step 9, the second thread tries again to
output the value of x. However, in the meanwhile, the first thread has reset the value of x to a new value.
Doing so, it removed the variety in this variable. This is reflected by the fact that x does not belongs
anymore to the first element of the automaton state. Therefore, the monitoring automaton let the output
occur.
In step 6 of the execution, the first thread attempts to output a constant while still in one of the branch
of a conditional whose condition carried variety. This is an unsafe behavior that the monitor forbids.
Consequently, the execution simply skips this command.
This section shows on an example that the monitoring mechanism is able to ensure the confidentiality
of private inputs. The next section proves this fact for any monitored execution.
6 Properties of the Monitoring Mechanism
After formally defining the monitoring mechanism, this section collates the monitor’s characteristics to
the standard properties of soundness and, specific to monitors, transparency. Section 6.1 proves the
soundness of the monitoring mechanism with regard to the notion of non-interference. If the monitor
fulfill the soundness property, it is of course impossible for it to be complete, as the non-interference
problem is undecidable, or transparent, as with an interfering execution the monitor can be either trans-
parent or sound but not both. However, section 6.2 still proves that the monitor is transparent for a non
trivial set of executions. .
6.1 Soundness
The monitoring mechanism is proved to be sound with regard to the non-interference property for ex-
ecutions. This means that, for any output sequences generated during the monitored execution of any
program Θ started in the initial state ζI
Θ,σ
and value stores σ′ low equivalent to σ, there exists a thread
interleaving such that during the monitored execution of Θ started in the initial state ζI
Θ,σ′
the same output
sequence is generated. This property is formally stated by theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.1 (Monitored Executions are Non-interfering).
For all programs Θ, value stores σ, any monitored execution of Θ started in the initial state ζI
Θ,σ
is
non-interfering. This is formally stated as follows:
∀Θ,∀σ ∈ (X→ D) : o ∈ O[[Θ]]Mζ
I
Θ,σ ⇒ ni(Θ, M, ζ
I
Θ,σ, o)
Proof sketch. The proof — which can be found in Appendix A.1 — goes by induction on the derivation
tree of the current execution (ec). First, it relies on the fact that, because of the monitoring mechanism,
for any evaluation started with the same public inputs there exists an execution (e2) having a thread
interleaving “similar” to the one of the current execution. Additionally, it is demonstrated that, if a thread
of e2 follows a path in its sequential program different from the path followed by the equivalent thread
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in ec, nothing will be output by those threads until they reach an “equivalent state”. It is then possible to
show that ec and e2 have the same output sequence. 
6.2 Partial Transparency
A common property stated for monitors is transparency. A transparent monitor is one that does not
alter the behavior of the monitored program. An interfering execution has, with regard to confidentiality,
a faulty observable behavior. Therefore, a sound monitor enforcing non-interference has to alter the
observable behavior of such an execution. Consequently, it is impossible for a sound monitor enforcing
non-interference to also be transparent. However, for a precise set of programs, it is possible to prove
that the monitoring mechanism presented in this report achieves transparency — i.e. it does not alter the
observable behavior of any execution of those programs. This set of programs is the set of all programs
which are well typed under a type system similar to the one of Smith and Volpano [SV98].
This type system is described in Figure 10. The language used in this report includes two structures
which do not appear in the language used in [SV98]. The two typing rules added for those structures
are the only salient differences with the type system of Smith and Volpano [SV98]. The lattice of types
used has only two elements and is defined using the reflexive relation ≤ (L ≤ H). L is the type for public
data and H the type for private data. The typing environment, γ, prescribes types for identifiers and is
extended to handle expressions. γ(e) is the type of the expression e in the typing environment γ. It is
equal to the least upper bound of the types of the free variables appearing in e, or L if there is no free
variable in e. It is formally defined as follows:
γ(e) =
⊔
x∈FV(e)
γ(x)
For any sequential program P, if “γ ⊢S P : τ cmd” for some τ and γ in which every secret input is typed
secret — i.e. ∀x ∈ S(P), γ(x) = H — then P is said to be well typed under the typing environment γ.
For any concurrent program Θ, if all its threads contain a program well typed under the same typing
environment γ, then Θ is said to be well typed under this typing environment γ. This is written “γ ⊢S Θ”.
Theorem 6.2 states that the monitoring mechanism does not alter executions of well typed programs.
In other words, the monitoring mechanism is transparent for any well typed program. To show that the
monitor is transparent, and still sound, for a bigger set of programs, consider the concurrent program
composed only of this sequential program : x := h; x :=0; output x. h is the only secret input. Ev-
ery execution is non-interfering. But as the type system is flow insensitive, this program is ill-typed.
However, the monitoring mechanism does not interfere with the outputs of this program while still guar-
anteeing that any monitored execution is non-interfering.
Theorem 6.2 (Partial-transparency: monitoring preserves type-safe programs).
For all programsΘwith secret inputsS(Θ), typing environments γ with variables belonging toS(Θ) typed
secret, and value stores σ, if Θ is well typed under γ then the observable behavior of any monitored
execution of Θ started in the initial state ζI
Θ,σ
is equal to the observable behavior of the unmonitored
execution of Θ started in the initial state (σ, ∅). This is formally stated as follows:
γ ⊢S Θ ⇒ O[[Θ]]Mζ
I
Θ,σ = O[[Θ]]S(σ, ∅)
Proof sketch. As “γ ⊢S Θ” implies “γ ⊢E Θ”, the proof follows from lemmas A.10 and A.11. 
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γ ⊢S skip : τ cmd
(TS-SKIP)
γ(e) ≤ γ(x) τ ≤ γ(x)
γ ⊢S x := e : τ cmd
(TS-ASSIGN)
γ(e) ≤ L
γ ⊢S output e : L cmd
(TS-OUTPUT)
γ ⊢S S
h : τ cmd γ ⊢S S
t : τ cmd
γ ⊢S S
h ; S t : τ cmd
(TS-SEQ)
γ(e) ≤ τ′ γ ⊢S S
true : τ′ cmd γ ⊢S S
false : τ′ cmd τ ≤ τ′
γ ⊢S if e then S
true else S false end : τ cmd
(TS-IF)
γ(e) ≤ L γ ⊢S S
l : L cmd
γ ⊢S while e do S
l done : L cmd
(TS-WHILE)
γ(e) ≤ L γ ⊢S S
s : L cmd
γ ⊢S with x̄ when e do S
s done : L cmd
(TS-SYNC)
Figure 10: The type system used for comparison
7 Conclusion
This report addresses the problem of the respect of the secret data confidentiality by concurrent programs.
The problem is formalized using the non-interference property which states that a program is safe if and
only if its publicly observable behavior is not influenced by the values of its private inputs.
This problem is usually addressed using static analyses. To the author’s knowledge, the solution
proposed in this report is the only dynamic analysis dealing with non-interference in a concurrent setting.
It consists in a monitoring mechanism enforcing the respect of the confidentiality of secret inputs. It is
defined as a special semantics communicating with a security automaton. The role of the semantics is
to send abstractions of the events occurring during the execution to the automaton. Then, it executes the
program in accordance to the answers sent back by the automaton. This latter tracks the information flows
and controls — allows, modifies or denies — the execution of output statements and synchronization
commands.
As the proposed mechanism deals with non-interference — which is not a property of an execution
trace —, it significantly differs from usual monitors. The dynamic analysis proposed is required to
take into account the content of branches which are not executed. Additionally, due to the fact that the
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monitor enforces non-interference on the fly, it is also required to change the position of synchronization
commands while still enforcing the thread interleaving constraints induced by the original position of
those commands.
Section 6 not only proves that this monitoring mechanism is sound — in the sense that it enforces
non-interference for any execution —, but also that it is transparent for any program well typed under a
type system similar to the one of Smith and Volpano [SV98].
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A Proofs
The following proofs have been written before minor modifications of the notations used and has not
been rewritten yet. Consequently, some of the notations found in the proofs may be different from those
used in the previous sections. However the modifications are straightforward.
A.1 Soundness
A.1.1 Definitions
Notations. For any sup and any i, let ζ
sup
i
= (ς
sup
i
, q
sup
i
) = ((σ
sup
i
, λ
sup
i
), (V
sup
i
,W
sup
i
, L
sup
i
,w
sup
i
)).
Owned locks. owns(S ) is the set of all locks currently owned by the thread executing S .
owns(x := e) = ∅
owns(output e) = ∅
owns(skip) = ∅
owns(∅) = ∅
owns(S 1 ; S 2) = owns(S 1) ∪ owns(S 2)
owns(if e then S 1 else S 2 end) = owns(S 1) ∪ owns(S 2)
owns(while e do S done) = owns(S )
owns(with x̄ when e do S done) = owns(S )
owns(⊗(P1, P2)[S ]) = owns(S )
owns(⊙x̄[S ]) = x̄ ∪ owns(S )
Underlying low equivalence. The following is a definition of low equivalence between states of mon-
itored executions.
Definition A.1 (Low Equivalent Thread Monitoring States).
Two monitored execution states ((σ1, λ1), q1) and ((σ2, λ2), q2) are low equivalent, written ((σ1, λ1), q1) 
((σ2, λ2), q2), if and only if:
• q1 = q2 = (V,W, L,w) and w ∈ L(⊥
∗),
• ∀x < V : σ1(x) = σ2(x),
• ∀x < L : x ∈ λ1 ⇔ x ∈ λ2.
By extension, two execution states — (ς1, Q1) and (ς2, Q2) — of a pool of threads Θ are con-
sidered low equivalent, written (ς1, Q1)  (ς2, Q2), if and only if, for all ı in the domain of Θ,
(ς1, extractState(Q1, ı))  (ς2, extractState(Q2, ı)).
State coherency.
Definition A.2 (State coherency).
A monitored execution state ζ — equals to ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) — is coherent with an monitored statement
S , written ζ ⊢ S , if and only if:
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• ∀x : x ∈ W ⇒ x ∈ V ,
• S = ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b] =⇒ modify(S b) ⊆ modify(Pe),
• S = ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b] =⇒ (needs(S b) ∪ owns(S b)) ⊆ needs(Pe),
• S = ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b] =⇒ (¬stops(Pe)⇒ ¬stops(S b)),
• (S = ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b] ∧ ∃ w′ s.t. w = ⊤w′) =⇒ modify(Pe) ∪modify(Pu) ⊆ W,
• (S = ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b] ∧ ∃ w′ s.t. w = ⊤w′) =⇒ needs(Pe) ∪ needs(Pu) ⊆ L,
• (S = ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b] ∧ ∃ w′ s.t. w = ⊤w′) =⇒ (∀l ∈ (needs(S b) \ owns(S b)) : l < λ),
• S = ⊙x̄[S ′] =⇒ ((σ, λ \ x̄), (V,W, L,w)) ⊢ S ′,
• (S = ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S ′] ∧ ∃ w′ s.t. w = aw′) =⇒ (ς, (V,W, L,w′)) ⊢ S ′,
Evaluation context. The proof will make use of evaluation contexts [NRNH99, Sect. 5.5.1].
Definition A.3 (Evaluation context).
An evaluation context is a monitored statement containing a unique hole which is written . Evaluation
contexts are described by the following grammar:
〈eval-context〉 ::=  | 〈eval-context〉 ; 〈prog〉
| ⊙〈ident-set〉[〈eval-context〉]
| ⊗(〈prog〉, 〈prog〉)[〈eval-context〉]
Definition A.4 (Evaluation context as a function).
Every evaluation context E is overloaded such that it is also a function mapping monitored statements
to monitored statements. This function returns the monitored statements corresponding to E where  is
replaced by the function’s argument. Formally, this function is defined as follows:
E(S ) =















S if and only if E = 
E′(S ) ; P if and only if E = E′ ; P
⊙x̄[E′(S )] if and only if E = ⊙x̄[E′]
⊗(P1, P2)[E
′(S )] if and only if E = ⊗(P1, P2)[E
′]
Definition A.5 (Context word of an evaluation context).
During any evaluation, a context word w evolves with the monitored statement S under evaluation. This
statement can be expressed using an evaluation context E and another monitored statement S ′ — S =
E(S ′). (w ↓E) is the prefix of w which has been created in the same time as the evaluation context E.
Formally, this function is defined as follows:
(w↓E) =















ǫ if E = 
(w↓E′ ) if E = E
′ ; P
(w↓E′ ) if E = ⊙x̄[E
′]
a (w′ ↓E′ ) if E = ⊗(P
e, Pu)[E′] and w = aw′
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Bi-similarity
Definition A.6 (Bi-similarity of execution stages).
An execution stage is a pair of a monitored execution state and a monitored statement. The execution
stage (ζ1 ⊢ S 1) is bi-similar to the execution stage (ζ2 ⊢ S 2), written (ζ1 ⊢ S 1) ∼ (ζ2 ⊢ S 2), if and only if
they are coherent — ζ1 ⊢ S 1 and ζ2 ⊢ S 2 — and one, at least, of the following is true:
A.6
⊳1 S 1 = S 2 and ζ1  ζ2,
A.6
⊳2 there exist an evaluation context E, four programs P
e
1
, Pu
1
, Pe
2
, Pu
2
and two monitored statements S b
1
and S b
2
such that all the following is true:
(a) S 1 = E(⊗(P
e
1
, Pu
1
)[S b
1
]) and S 2 = E(⊗(P
e
2
, Pu
2
)[S b
2
]),
(b) V1 = V2 , W1 = W2 , L1 = L2 and (w1 ↓E) = (w2 ↓E),
(c) ∀i ∈ {1, 2} : ∃ws
i
s.t. wi = (wi ↓E) ⊤ w
s
i
,
(d) ∀x < V1 : σ1(x) = σ2(x),
(e) ∀l < L1 : l ∈ λ1 ⇔ l ∈ λ2,
(f) (¬stops(Pe
1
) ∧ ¬stops(Pu
1
))⇔ (¬stops(Pe
2
) ∧ ¬stops(Pu
2
)).
By extension, two execution states — (ς1, Q1) and (ς2, Q2) — and two pool of threads — Θ1 and Θ2
— are considered bi-similar, written ((ς1, Q1) ⊢ Θ1) ∼ ((ς2, Q2) ⊢ Θ2), if and only if, for all ı in the domain
of Θ, ((ς1, extractState(Q1, ı)) ⊢ Θ1(ı)) ∼ ((ς2, extractState(Q2, ı)) ⊢ Θ2(ı)).
A.1.2 Lemmas
Lemma A.1 (Evaluation Context Generic Evaluation Rule). For all evaluation contexts E, monitored
statements S and S ′, and monitored execution states ((σ, λ), q) and ((σ′, λ′), q′), E(S ) in state ((σ, λ), q)
evaluates to E(S ′) yielding state ((σ′, λ′∪owns(E(∅))), q′) and output o in n steps if and only if S in state
((σ, λ \ owns(E(∅))), q) evaluates to S ′ yielding state ((σ′, λ′), q′) and output o in n steps.
Proof. It follows directly from the definitions of evaluation context (Definition A.3 and A.4) and the
semantics rules applying to E(S ). E′(S ) ; P takes one evaluation step if and only if E′(S ) takes one
evaluation step in the same state. From the rule (ES-LOCKEDstep), ⊙x̄[E
′(S )] takes one evaluation step
in state ((σ, λ), q) yielding state ((σ′, λ′ ∪ owns(E(∅))), q′) if and only if E′(S ) takes one evaluation step
in state ((σ, λ \ owns(⊙x̄[∅])), q) yielding state ((σ′, λ′), q′). ⊗(P1, P2)[E
′(S )] takes one evaluation step if
and only if E′(S ) takes one evaluation step in the same state. 
Lemma A.2 (Branching Context of Evaluation Context Preservation). For all evaluation contexts E,
monitored statements S and S ′, and monitored execution states ζ and ζ′:
⋆1 〈| ζ ⊢ E(S ) |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′ ⊢ E(S ′) |〉
implies that (w↓E) = (w
′ ↓E).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Definitions A.4 and A.5 and the semantics rules of Figure 8 going
by structural induction on E. 
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Lemma A.3 (Coherency preservation). For all monitored statements S and S ′, and monitored execution
states ζ and ζ′ such that:
⋆1 ζ ⊢ S ,
⋆2 〈| ζ ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′ ⊢ S ′ |〉 ,
it is true that:
• ζ′ ⊢ S ′.
This lemma states that coherency of monitored execution states is an execution invariant.
Proof. The proof of this lemma goes by structural induction on S . If S is an atomic action, only the first
property (∀x : x ∈ W ⇒ x ∈ V) can apply. It is then obvious from the semantics rules of Figure 8 and
the transition function of Figure 6 that ζ′ ⊢ S ′. For branched statements, the properties are obvious after
deducing from the semantics rules that initially such a statement is always of the form ⊗(Pe, Pu)[Pe]. For
locked statements, it follows from the semantics rule for such statements which temporarily releases the
locks owned by a thread before executing one step for this thread. 
Lemma A.4 (Bi-similarity preservation). For all monitored statements S 1 and S 2, and monitored execu-
tion states ζ1, ζ
′
1
, ζ2 and ζ
′
2
such that:
⋆1 (ζ1 ⊢ S 1) ∼ (ζ2 ⊢ S 2),
⋆2 V
′
1
= V ′
2
, W ′
1
= W ′
2
, L′
1
= L′
2
, w′
1
= w1 and w
′
2
= w2,
⋆3 ∀x < V
′
1
: σ′
1
(x) = σ′
2
(x),
⋆4 ∀l < L
′
1
: l ∈ λ′
1
⇔ l ∈ λ′
2
,
it is true that (ζ′
1
⊢ S 1) ∼ (ζ
′
2
⊢ S 2).
Proof. This theorem is straightforward. It follows directly from Definition A.6. Every property in this
definition involving the execution state is either one of⋆2, ⋆3,⋆4 or follows directly from one of them. 
Lemma A.5 (High Context Evaluation Step). For all evaluation contexts E, monitored statements S and
S ′, output sequences o and monitored execution states ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) and ((σ′, λ′), (V ′,W ′, L′,w′))
such that:
⋆1 ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) ⊢ S ,
⋆2 〈| ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) ⊢ E(S ) |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ((σ
′, λ′), (V ′,W ′, L′,w′)) ⊢ E(S ′) |〉 ,
⋆3 (w↓E) < L(⊥
⋆),
it is true that:
• o is equal to ǫ,
• V ′ = V , W ′ = W , L′ = L and (w′ ↓E) = (w↓E),
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• ∀x < modify(S ) : σ′(x) = σ(x),
• ∀l < needs(S ) ∪ owns(S ) : l ∈ λ′ ⇔ l ∈ λ.
Proof. This is trivial and follows directly from the transition function of Figure 6. Because of ⋆A.1.2
any output is forbidden and any possible transition does not modifies V , W , L and (w ↓E); except for
assignments. However, in the case of an assignment to x, because of and , x belongs to W and V so the
transition as no effect on the automaton state and the property on σ and σ′ holds. Finally, for any lock
which is not needed or already owned for the execution of S , an evaluation step of S will not modify the
fact that l belongs or not to λ. 
Lemma A.6 (High Branch Traversal). For all evaluation contexts E, monitored statements S and moni-
tored execution states ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) such that:
⋆1 ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) ⊢ E(S ),
⋆2 λ ∩ (needs(S ) \ owns(S )) = ∅,
⋆3 ¬stops(S ),
⋆4 (w↓E) < L(⊥
⋆),
it is true that, there exists a monitored execution state ((σ′, λ′), (V ′,W ′, L′,w′)) such that:
• 〈| ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) ⊢ E(S ) |〉
ǫ
−→⋆M(O) 〈| ((σ
′, λ′), (V ′,W ′, L′,w′)) ⊢ E(∅) |〉 .
Proof. The proof of this lemma goes by structural induction on S . Such induction goes by reducing the
“structural size” of S at any induction step. Usually this type of induction does not work well with while-
statements. For this proof, the hypothesis ⋆3 solves the problem of while-statements. Synchronization
commands can also be a problem. This one is solved by the hypotheses ⋆3 and ⋆2. Additionally, in order
for the proof to go smoothly, it is required to give a smaller “structural size” to the branched statement
structure than to the structure of if-statements and while-statements; similarly for locked statements and
synchronization commands. The small details of the proof follows directly from Lemma A.5. 
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Lemma A.7 (One Step Soundness). For all monitored statements S and S ′, and monitored execution
states ζ1, ζ
′
1
and ζ2 such that:
⋆1 ζ1  ζ2,
⋆2 ζ1 ⊢ S ,
⋆3 〈| ζ1 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
1
⊢ S ′ |〉 ,
it is true that, there exists a monitored execution state ζ′
2
such that ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
and one of the following is
true:
⊳1 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 ,
⊳2 all the following is true:
(a) there exist an evaluation context E and three monitored statements S b, Pe and Pu such that S is
equal to E(S b), S ′ is equal to E(⊗(Pe, Pu)[Pe]) and w1 = (w1 ↓E),
(b) w′
2
= w2⊤,
(c) o = ǫ,
(d) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) |〉 .
Proof sketch. The idea behind this lemma is to state that two executions of the same statement started in
low-equivalent states either take the same execution step or diverge because it was a branching statement
and both execution take different branch with the implication that the branching condition was influenced
by some secret value. 
Formal proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of the derivation tree of the global hypothesis⋆3
and by cases on the first rule used for this derivation tree. If the first rule used for the derivation tree of
the global hypothesis ⋆3 is:
(EM-OK) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is an action (i.e. S = “skip” or S = “y := e” or S = “output e”), “(q1, S )
OK
−−→ q′
1
” and
“〈| ς1 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′
1
⊢ ∅ |〉”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM-OK) and the grammar of the language.
It can also be deduced from the rule (EM-OK), the transition function of the monitoring au-
tomaton, and the semantics (ES).
(2) There exists q′
2
such that (q2, S )
OK
−−→ q′
2
and q′
1
= q′
2
.
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1) and the global hypothesis ⋆1 — as well as
the definition of low equivalence (Definition A.1).
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
Case 1: S = skip
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(a) There exists ς′
2
such that 〈| ς2 ⊢ A |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′
2
⊢ ∅ |〉 and ς′
1
= ς′
2
.
It follows directly from the case hypothesis, the rule (ES-SKIP), the local conclusion
(1) and the global hypothesis ⋆1.
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
It follows directly from the the rule (EM-OK) and the local conclusions (2) and (a).
Case 2: S = output e
(a) FV(e) ∩ V1 = ∅.
It follows from the case hypothesis, the fact that “(q1, S )
OK
−−→ q′
1
” (from the local
conclusion (1)), and the only possible automaton transition (T-OUTPUT-ok).
(b) σ1(e) = σ2(e).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (a), the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the
definition of low equivalence (Definition A.1).
(c) There exists ς′
2
such that 〈| ς2 ⊢ A |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′
2
⊢ ∅ |〉 and ς′
1
= ς′
2
.
It follows directly from the case hypothesis, the rule (ES-OUTPUT), the global hy-
pothesis ⋆1 and the local conclusions (1) and (b).
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
It follows directly from the the rule (EM-OK) and the local conclusions (2) and (c).
Case 3: S = y := e
(a) σ′
1
= σ1[y 7→ σ1(e)] and λ1 = λ
′
1
.
It follows directly from the case hypothesis, the local conclusion (1) and the only
possible rule (ES-ASSIGN).
(b) There exist σ′
2
and λ′
2
such that 〈| ς2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς′
2
⊢ ∅ |〉, σ′
2
= σ2[y 7→ σ2(e)]
and λ2 = λ
′
2
.
It follows directly from the case hypothesis and the only possible rule (ES-ASSIGN).
(c) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 .
It follows from the local conclusions (2) and (b).
(d) ∀x < V ′
1
: σ′
1
(x) = σ′
2
(x).
Sub-case 2.a: FV(e) ∩ V1 , ∅ or y ∈ W1.
(α) V ′
1
= V1 ∪ {y}.
From the sub-case hypothesis, the automaton transition of the local conclusion
(1) is (T-ASSIGN-sec). From which comes the desired result.
(•) ∀x < V ′
1
: σ′
1
(x) = σ′
2
(x).
It follows directly from the global hypothesis ⋆1 and local conclusions (a), (b)
and (α).
Sub-case 2.b: FV(e) ∩ V1 = ∅ and y < W1.
(α) V ′
1
= V1 \ {y}.
From the sub-case hypothesis, the automaton transition of the local conclusion
(1) is (T-ASSIGN-pub). From which comes the desired result.
(β) σ1(e) = σ2(e).
It follows directly from the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the sub-case hypothesis
FV(e) ∩ V1 = ∅.
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(•) ∀x < V ′
1
: σ′
1
(x) = σ′
2
(x).
It follows directly from the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the local conclusions (α),
(a), (b) and (β).
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
The first part of the above result comes directly from the local conclusion (c). The
second part of the result — ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
— comes from the definition A.1, the local
conclusions (2) for the first part of the definition, the local conclusions (d) for the
second part of the definition, and the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the local conclusions
(a) and (b) for the last part.
(EM-EDIT) then we can conclude that :
(1) the following holds:
• (q1, S )
output δ
−−−−−−→ q′
1
,
• S is “output e”,
• w1 ∈ L(⊥
∗) and FV(e) ∩ V1 , ∅,
• q′
1
= q1,
• o = δ,
• ς′
1
= ς1.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM-EDIT), the only automaton transition
returning an action as output (T-OUTPUT-def) and the rule (ES-OUTPUT).
(2) There exists q′
2
such that (q2, S )
output δ
−−−−−−→ q′
2
and q′
1
= q′
2
.
From the local conclusion (1), w1 ∈ L(⊥
∗) and FV(e) ∩ V1 , ∅. Hence, from the global
hypothesis ⋆1, w2 ∈ L(⊥
∗) and FV(e)∩V2 , ∅. Then the automaton transition (T-OUTPUT-
def) applies to q2; with the consequences that q
′
2
= q2. Hence, from the global hypothesis ⋆1,
q′
1
= q′
2
.
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
The rule (ES-OUTPUT) implies that there exists ς
′
2
such that 〈| ς2 ⊢ output δ |〉
δ
−→
S
〈| ς′
2
⊢
∅ |〉 with ς′
2
= ς2. Hence the rule (EM-EDIT) and the local conclusion (2) imply that 〈| ζ2 ⊢
S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 . From the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the local conclusions (1)
and (2), q′
1
= q′
2
. Hence from the global hypothesis ⋆1, the fact that ς
′
1
= ς1 (from the local
conclusion (1)) and the previous conclusion ς′
2
= ς2, ζ
′
1
 ζ′
2
.
(EM-NO) then we can conclude that :
(1) w1 < L(⊥
∗). It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM-NO) and the only automaton
transition denying an action (T-OUTPUT-no).
(•) The first rule used can not be (EM-NO). It follows from the fact that the local conclusion (1) is
in contradiction with the global hypothesis ⋆1.
(EM-IF) then we can conclude that :
(1) there exists v belonging to the set true, false such that:
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• S is “if e then Ptrue else Pfalse end”,
• σ1(e) = v,
• (q1, branch(λ1, e, P
v, P¬v))
OK
−−→ q′
1
,
• ς′
1
= ς1,
• S ′ is “⊗(Pv, P¬v)[Pv]”.
It follows directly from the rule (EM-IF).
(•) the property holds.
Case 1: σ2(e) = σ1(e)
(a) there exists q′
2
such that (q2, branch(λ2, e, P
v, P¬v))
OK
−−→ q′
2
and q′
2
= q′
1
.
The conditions of the two possible transitions for the automaton input
branch(λ2, e, P
v, P¬v) are based on values which, because of the global hypothe-
sis ⋆1, are equal for q2 and q1. Therefore, the same transition can be taken by the
automaton.
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
It follows from the rule (EM-IF), the global hypothesis ⋆1, the case hypothesis and
the local conclusions (1) and (a).
Case 2: σ2(e) , σ1(e)
(a) there exist an evaluation context E and a monitored statement S b such that S is equal
to E(S b) and S ′ is equal to E(⊗(Pv, P¬v)[Pv]).
It follows directly from the rule (EM-IF). E is  and S
b is S .
(b) FV(e) ∩ V1 , ∅.
It follows by contradiction using the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the case hypothesis.
(c) there exists wp such that w′
1
= wp⊤.
The local conclusion (b) implies that the transition used for the automaton input
branch(λ, e, Pv, P¬v) in state q1 is (T-BRANCH-high). Hence, the desired result
holds.
(d) there exists q′
2
such that (q2, branch(λ, e, ), )
OK
−−→ qt
2
and q′
2
= q′
1
.
The conditions of the two possible transitions for the automaton input
branch(λ2, e, P
v, P¬v) are based on values which, because of the global hypothe-
sis ⋆1, are equal for q2 and q1. Therefore, the same transition can be taken by the
automaton.
(e) there exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E(⊗(P¬v, Pv)[P¬v]) |〉 and
ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
The rule (EM-IF) and the local conclusions (1) and (d) imply the desired result.
(•) the second possible global conclusion holds.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (1), (a), (c), (d) and (e).
(EM-WHILE) then we can conclude that :
(•) the property holds.
The proof is similar to the one for (EM-IF).
(EM-WITH) then we can conclude that :
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(1) there exists qt
1
such that:
• S is with x̄ when e do S w done,
• x̄ ∩ λ1 = ∅,
• σ1(e) = true,
• (q1, sync(x̄, e))
OK
−−→ q′
1
,
• FV(e) ∩ V1 = ∅,
• L1 ∩ x̄ = ∅,
• ζ′
1
= ((σ1, λ1 ∪ x̄), q
′
1
),
• S ′ = ⊙x̄[S w].
It follows directly from the global hypothesis ⋆1, the semantics rule (EM-WITH) and from the
only automaton transition applying to the automaton input.
(2) x̄ ∩ λ2 = ∅ and σ2(e) = true.
Both equalities follow from the global hypothesis ⋆1, the definition of low equivalence for
states of monitored executions (definition A.1) and the local conclusion (1) — L1∩ x̄ = ∅ and
FV(e) ∩ V1 = ∅.
(3) There exists q′
2
such that (q2, sync(x̄, e))
OK
−−→ q′
2
and q′
2
= q′
1
.
The global hypothesis ⋆1 and the local conclusion (1) imply that L2∩ x̄ = ∅ and FV(e)∩V2 =
∅. Therefore, the desired results hold.
(4) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
2
= ((σ2, λ2 ∪ x̄), q
′
2
).
It follows from the rule (EM-WITH) and the local conclusions (2) and (3).
(5) ∀x < V ′
1
: σ′
1
(x) = σ′
2
(x).
The local conclusion (1) and the automaton transition (T-SYNC) imply that V ′
1
is equal to V1.
In addition, the evaluation rule (EM-WITH), the global hypothesis ⋆3 and the local conclusion
(4) imply that σ′
1
is equal to σ1 and σ
′
2
is equal to σ2. Therefore, the desired result follows
from the global hypothesis ⋆1.
(6) ∀x < L′
1
: x ∈ λ′
1
⇔ x ∈ λ′
2
.
The local conclusion (1) and the automaton transition (T-SYNC) imply that L′
1
= L1. In
addition, the evaluation rule (EM-WITH), the global hypothesis ⋆3 and the local conclusion
(4) imply that λ′
1
= λ1 ∪ x̄ and λ
′
2
= λ2 ∪ x̄. So the desired result is implied by the global
hypothesis ⋆1.
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (4), (5) and (6).
(EM-SEQexit) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is ∅ ; S r, o = ǫ, ζ′
1
= ζ1 and S
′ = S r.
It follows directly from (EM-SEQexit).
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
It follows directly from (EM-SEQexit) and the global hypothesis ⋆1.
(EM-SEQstep) then we can conclude that :
(1) the following holds:
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• S is S i ; S r,
• 〈| ζ1  S
i |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′
1
 S j |〉 is a sub-derivation tree of the derivation tree of S ,
• S ′ = S j ; S r.
It follows directly from the rule (EM-SEQstep).
(2) There exists ζ′
2
such that ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
and one of the possible global conclusions holds for the
monitored statement S i.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis.
(•) The property holds.
Case 1: the first global conclusion holds for S i.
(a) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S
i |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S j |〉
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2) and the case hypothesis.
(•) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉
It follows directly from the local conclusion (a) and the definition of the evaluation
rule (EM-SEQstep).
Case 2: the second global conclusion holds for S i.
(a) there exist an evaluation context E and three monitored statements S b, Pe and Pu
such that:
• S i is equal to E(S b) and S j is equal to E(⊗(Pe, Pu)[Pe]),
• w′
2
= w2⊤,
• o = ǫ,
• 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S
i |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) |〉 .
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2) and the case hypothesis.
(b) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S
i ; S r |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) ; S r |〉
It follows directly from the local conclusion (a) and the evaluation rule (EM-SEQstep).
(c) there exist E′, equal to “E ; S r”, such that S is equal to E′(S b) and S ′ is equal to
E(⊗(Pe, Pu)[Pe]).
This result is implied by the local conclusions (1) and (a).
(d) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E′(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) |〉 .
From the local conclusion (c), E′(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) is equal to “E(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) ; S r”.
Hence, the local conclusions (1) and (b) imply the desired result.
(•) the second possible global conclusion holds.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (c), (a) and (d).
(EM-BRANCHexit) then we can conclude that :
(1) there exists qt
1
such that:
• S is ⊗(Pe, Pu)[∅],
• (q1, merge(P
e, Pu))
OK
−−→ q1,
• ς′
1
= ς1
• S ′ is ∅.
It follows directly from the rule (EM-BRANCHexit) and the global hypothesis ⋆1.
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(2) There exists q′
2
such that (q2, merge(P
e, Pu))
OK
−−→ q2.
It follows directly from the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the definition of the transition (T-
MERGE-low).
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
This follows directly from the global hypothesis ⋆1 and local conclusions (1) and (2).
(EM-BRANCHstep) then we can conclude that :
(1) there exist three monitoring statements S b, S b
′
, Pe and Pu such that:
• S b , ∅,
• S is equal to ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b],
• S ′ is equal to ⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b
′
],
• 〈| ζ1  S
b |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′
1
 S b
′
|〉 is a sub-derivation tree of the global hypothesis ⋆3.
It follows directly from the definition of (EM-BRANCHstep).
(2) There exists ζ′
2
such that ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
and one of the possible global conclusions holds for the
monitored statement S b.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis and the local conclusion (1).
(•) The property holds.
Case 1: the first global conclusion holds for S b.
(a) 〈| ζ2  S
b |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ′
2
 S b
′
|〉
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2) and the case hypothesis.
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2  S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
 S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
This is direct using the definition of the rule (EM-BRANCHstep) and the local con-
clusion (a).
Case 2: the second global conclusion holds for S b.
(a) there exist an evaluation context E and three monitored statements S b2 , Pe2 and Pu2
such that:
• S b is equal to E(S b2 ) and S b
′
is equal to E(⊗(Pe2 , Pu2 )[Pe2 ]),
• w′
2
= w2⊤,
• o = ǫ,
• 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S
b |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E(⊗(Pu2 , Pe2 )[Pu2 ]) |〉 .
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2) and the case hypothesis.
(b) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ ⊗(P
e, Pu)[S b] |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ ⊗(Pe, Pu)[E(⊗(Pu2 , Pe2 )[Pu2 ])] |〉
It follows directly from the local conclusion (a) and the evaluation rule (EM-
BRANCHstep).
(c) there exist E′, equal to “⊗(Pe, Pu)[E]”, such that S is equal to E′(S b2 ) and S ′ is equal
to E(⊗(Pe2 , Pu2 )[Pe2 ]).
This result is implied by the local conclusions (1) and (a).
(d) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E′(⊗(Pu2 , Pe2 )[Pu2 ]) |〉 .
From the local conclusion (c), E′(⊗(Pu2 , Pe2 )[Pu2 ]) is equal to
“⊗(Pe, Pu)[E(⊗(Pu2 , Pe2 )[Pu2 ])]”. Hence, the local conclusions (1) and (b)
imply the desired result.
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(•) the second possible global conclusion holds.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (c), (a) and (d).
(EM-LOCKEDexit) then we can conclude that :
(1) there exists a set of identifiers x̄ such that:
• S is ⊙x̄[∅],
• S ′ is ∅,
• ζ′
1
= ((σ1, λ1 \ x̄), q1).
It follows directly from the rule (EM-LOCKEDexit).
(•) There exists ζ′
2
such that 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
This follows directly from the local conclusions (1), the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the rule
(EM-LOCKEDexit).
(EM-LOCKEDstep) then we can conclude that :
(1) there exist a set of identifiers x̄, a set of locks λt
1
and two monitored statements S s and S s
′
, such
that:
• S is equal to ⊙x̄[S s],
• S ′ is equal to ⊙x̄[S s
′
],
• S s , ∅,
• 〈| ((σ1, λ1 \ x̄), q1)  S
s |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ((σ′
1
, λt
1
), q′
1
)  S s
′
|〉 ,
• λ′
1
= λt
1
∪ x̄.
It follows directly from the definition of (EM-LOCKEDstep).
(2) ζ1  ζ2 ⇒ ((σ1, λ1 \ x̄), q1)  ((σ2, λ2 \ x̄), q2).
This is obvious from the Definition A.1.
(3) ζ1 ⊢ ⊙x̄[S
s]⇒ ((σ1, λ1 \ x̄), q1) ⊢ S
s.
This is obvious from the Definition A.2.
(4) There exists ((σ′
2
, λt
2
) , q′
2
) such that ((σ′
1
, λt
1
), q′
1
)  ((σ′
2
, λt
2
), q′
2
) and one of the possible
global conclusions holds for the monitored statement S s.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis and the local conclusions (1), (2) and (3).
(•) The property holds.
Case 1: the first global conclusion holds for S s.
(a) 〈| ((σ2, λ2 \ x̄), q2)  S
s |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ((σ′
2
, λt
2
), q′
2
)  S s
′
|〉
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2) and the case hypothesis.
(•) There exists ζ′
2
, equals to ((σ′
2
, λt
2
∪ x̄), q′
2
), such that 〈| ζ2  S |〉
o
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2

S ′ |〉 and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
This is direct using the definition of the rule (EM-BRANCHstep) and the local con-
clusions (a), (4) and (1).
Case 2: the second global conclusion holds for S s.
(a) there exist an evaluation context E and three monitored statements S b, Pe and Pu
such that:
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• S s is equal to E(S b) and S s
′
is equal to E(⊗(Pe, Pu)[Pe]),
• w′
2
= w2⊤,
• o = ǫ,
• 〈| ((σ2, λ2 \ x̄), q2) ⊢ S
s |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ((σ
′
2
, λt
2
), q′
2
) ⊢ E(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) |〉 .
It follows directly from the local conclusion (4) and the case hypothesis.
(b) there exists E′, equal to “⊙x̄[E]”, such that S is equal to E′(S b) and S ′ is equal to
E′(⊗(Pe, Pu)[Pe]).
This result is implied by the local conclusions (1) and (a).
(c) 〈| ((σ2, λ2), q2) ⊢ ⊙x̄[S
s] |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ((σ
′
2
, λt
2
∪ x̄), q′
2
) ⊢ ⊙x̄[E(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu])] |〉 .
It follows directly from the evaluation rule (EM-LOCKEDstep) and the local conclu-
sions (1) and (a).
(d) 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S |〉
ǫ
−→M(O) 〈| ζ
′
2
⊢ E′(⊗(Pu, Pe)[Pu]) |〉 with λ′
2
= λt
2
∪ x̄.
This result is implied by the local conclusions (c), (1), and (b).
(e) ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
The local conclusion (4) and the definition A.1 imply ∀x < L′
1
: x ∈ λt
1
⇔ x ∈ λt
2
.
Combined with the local conclusions (1) and (d), it implies ∀x < L′
1
: x ∈ λ′
1
⇔ x ∈
λ′
2
. This property and the local conclusion (4) imply the desired result.
(•) the second possible global conclusion holds.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (b), (a), (d) and (e).

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Lemma A.8 (General Soundness). For all thread pools Θ1, Θ2 and Θ
f
1
, concurrent execution states ϑ1,
ϑ2 and ϑ
f
1
, and output sequences o such that:
⋆1 (ϑ1 ⊢ Θ1) ∼ (ϑ2 ⊢ Θ2),
⋆2 〈|ϑ1 ⊢ Θ1 |〉
o
−→⋆M(O) 〈|ϑ
f
1
⊢ Θ
f
1
|〉 ,
it is true that, there exists a concurrent execution state ϑ
f
2
and a thread pool Θ
f
2
such that:
• 〈|ϑ2 ⊢ Θ2 |〉
o
−→⋆M(O) 〈|ϑ
f
2
⊢ Θ
f
2
|〉 .
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of the derivation of the global hypothesis ⋆2.
Obviously, the lemma holds if the length of the derivation is equal to 0. In that case o is equal to ǫ
and the conclusion holds with Θ
f
2
= Θ2 and ϑ
f
2
= ϑ2.
Otherwise, the global hypothesis ⋆2 implies that there exist a concurrent execution state ϑ
′
1
and a
thread pool Θ′
1
such that:
〈|ϑ1  Θ1 |〉
op
−→
M
〈|ϑ′1  Θ
′
1 |〉 (3)
〈|ϑ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1 |〉
os
−→⋆
M
〈|ϑ
f
1
⊢ Θ
f
1
|〉 (4)
o = opos (5)
The remaining of the proof demonstrates the existence of a concurrent execution state ϑ′
2
and a thread
pool Θ′
2
such that:
〈|ϑ2 ⊢ Θ2 |〉
op
−→⋆
M
〈|ϑ′2 ⊢ Θ
′
2 |〉
(ϑ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1) ∼ (ϑ
′
2 ⊢ Θ
′
2)
The desired property will then follow by induction. As (ϑ′
1
⊢ Θ′
1
) ∼ (ϑ′
2
⊢ Θ′
2
), using the inductive
hypothesis on (4), we get that there exists an execution state ϑ
f
2
and a thread pool Θ
f
2
such that:
〈|ϑ′2 ⊢ Θ
′
2 |〉
os
−→⋆
M
〈|ϑ
f
2
⊢ Θ
f
2
|〉
Consequently, 〈|ϑ2 ⊢ Θ2 |〉
o
−→⋆
M
〈|ϑ
f
2
⊢ Θ
f
2
|〉 .
Let ϑ1 be equal to (ς1, Q1). The only possible rule for the previous one step evaluation — (3) — is
(EM-CONCUR). It implies that there exists ı belonging to the domain of Θ1 such that:
〈| (ς1, extractState(Q1, ı))  Θ1(ı) |〉
op
−→
M
〈| (ς′1, q
′
1)  S
′
1 |〉 (6)
ϑ′1 = (ς
′
1, updateStates(Q1, ı, q
′
1)) (7)
Θ′1 = Θ1[ı 7→ S
′
1] (8)
Let ζ1 be (ς1, extractState(Q1, ı)), ζ2 be (ς2, extractState(Q2, ı)) — with ϑ2 = (ς2, Q2) —, S 1 be Θ1(ı) and
S 2 be Θ2(ı). Because of the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the definition of bi-simulation for thread pools, the
following is true: (ζ1 ⊢ S 1) ∼ (ζ2 ⊢ S 2). Therefore, one of the conclusions of definition A.6 has to hold.
def:execution-stages-bisimilarity
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Case 1: The conclusion ⊳1 of definition A.6 holds.
This conclusion states that “ζ1  ζ2”, “ζ1 ⊢ S 1” and S 1 is equal to S 2. Hence, as from (6) the moni-
tored statement S 1 in the monitored execution state ζ1 evaluates to S
′
1
yielding the output sequence
op and the monitored execution state ζ′
1
, lemma A.7 applies and one of its global conclusions has
to hold.
Sub-case 1.a: The global conclusion ⊳1 of lemma A.7 holds.
This conclusion states that there exists a monitored execution state ζ′
2
such that:
ζ′1  ζ
′
2 (9)
〈| ζ2 ⊢ S 2 |〉
op
−→
M
〈| ζ′2 ⊢ S
′
1 |〉 (10)
Let ϑ′
2
be equal to (ς′
2
, updateStates(Q2, ı, q
′
2
)) — with ζ′
2
= (ς′
2
, q′
2
) — and Θ′
2
be equal to
Θ2[ı 7→ S
′
1
]. The previous evaluation of S 2 — (10) — and the rule (EM-CONCUR) implies:
〈|ϑ2  Θ2 |〉
op
−→
M
〈|ϑ′
2
 Θ′
2
|〉
The global hypothesis ⋆1 implies that ζ1 ⊢ S 1 and ζ2 ⊢ S 2. Hence, lemma A.3, (6) and (10)
are sufficient to conclude that ζ′
1
⊢ S 1 and ζ
′
2
⊢ S 2. Therefore, as ζ
′
1
 ζ′
2
and Θ′
1
(ı) = Θ′
2
(ı),
the following is true:
(ζ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1(ı)) ∼ (ζ
′
2 ⊢ Θ
′
2(ı))
and, with ϑ′
1
= (ς′
1
, Q′
1
) and ϑ′
2
= (ς′
2
, Q′
2
),
((ς′1, extractState(Q
′
1, ı)) ⊢ Θ
′
1(ı)) ∼ ((ς
′
2, extractState(Q
′
2, ı)) ⊢ Θ
′
2(ı))
Equation (9) implies:
• V ′
1
= V ′
2
, W ′
1
= W ′
2
and L′
1
= L′
2
,
• ∀x < V ′
1
: σ′
1
(x) = σ′
2
(x),
• ∀l < L′
1
: x ∈ λ′
1
⇔ x ∈ λ′
2
.
For every , let w
j
1
be the forth element of extractState(Q1, ). extractState(Q1, ) is equal to
(V1,W1, L1,w
j
1
). Let w
j
2
be similarly defined. For every  — different from ı — in the do-
main of Θ′
1
, (8) implies Θ′
1
( ) = Θ1( ); and similarly for Θ
′
2
( ). As well, (7) implies that
extractState(Q′
1
, ) is equal to (V ′
1
,W ′
1
, L′
1
,w
j
1
); and similarly with extractState(Q′
2
, ). There-
fore, lemma A.4 applies and, for every  in the domain of Θ1 and different from ı:
((ς′1, extractState(Q
′
1, )) ⊢ Θ
′
1( )) ∼ ((ς
′
2, extractState(Q2, )) ⊢ Θ
′
2( ))
Consequently,
(ϑ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1) ∼ (ϑ
′
2 ⊢ Θ
′
2)
Sub-case 1.b: The global conclusion ⊳2 of lemma A.7 holds.
This conclusion states that there exists a monitored execution state ζ′
2
such that ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
and:
1. there exist an evaluation context E, a value v belonging to the set {true, false} and three
monitored statements S b, Ptrue and Pfalse such that S 1 — and S 2 because S 1 = S 2 —
is equal to E(S b), S ′
1
is equal to E(⊗(S v, S ¬v)[S v]) and w1 = (w1 ↓E),
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2. w′
2
= w2⊤,
3. op = ǫ,
4. 〈| ζ2 ⊢ S 2 |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| ζ′
2
⊢ E(⊗(S ¬v, S v)[S ¬v]) |〉 .
Let ϑ′
2
be equal to (ς′
2
, updateStates(Q2, ı, q
′
2
)) andΘ′
2
be equal toΘ2[ı 7→ E(⊗(S ¬v, S v)[S ¬v])].
The previous evaluation of S 2 with the monitoring execution state ζ2, the rule (EM-CONCUR)
and the equality between op and ǫ imply that 〈|ϑ2  Θ2 |〉
op
−→
M
〈|ϑ′
2
 Θ′
2
|〉 .
Lemma A.3, the global hypothesis ⋆1 and the evaluations of S 1 and S 2 imply that ζ
′
1
⊢ S ′
1
and ζ′
2
⊢ S ′
2
.
With Pe
1
= S b
1
= Pu
2
= S v and P
e
2
= S b
2
= Pu
1
= S ¬v, S
′
1
is equal to E(⊗(Pe
1
, Pu
1
)[S b
1
]) and S ′
2
is
equal to E(⊗(Pe
2
, Pu
2
)[S b
2
]). This is the point (a) of the second definition ⊳2 of bi-similarity.
The fact that ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
implies that V ′
1
= V ′
2
, W ′
1
= W ′
2
, L′
1
= L′
2
and (w′
1
↓E) = (w
′
2
↓E). This is
the point (b) of the second definition ⊳2 of bi-similarity.
From the global conclusion ⊳2 of lemma A.7, w1 = (w1 ↓E) and w
′
2
= w2⊤. The facts that
ζ1  ζ2 and ζ
′
1
 ζ′
2
imply that w1 = w2 and w
′
1
= w′
2
. Therefore, w′
1
= w1⊤ and w
′
2
= w2⊤.
This is the point (c) of the second definition ⊳2 of bi-similarity.
As ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
, we have that ∀x < V ′
1
: σ′
1
(x) = σ′
2
(x) and ∀l < L′
1
: l ∈ λ′
1
⇔ l ∈ λ′
2
. Those
properties are points (d) and (e) of the second definition ⊳2 of bi-similarity.
As Pe
1
= Pu
2
and Pe
2
= Pu
1
, its trivial to show that point (f) of the second definition ⊳2 of
bi-similarity holds.
Therefore,
(ζ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1(ı)) ∼ (ζ
′
2 ⊢ Θ
′
2(ı))
and, following a proof similar to the one used in the sub-case 1.a,
(ϑ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1) ∼ (ϑ
′
2 ⊢ Θ
′
2)
Case 2: The conclusion ⊳2 of definition A.6 holds.
This conclusion states that there exist an evaluation context E, four programs Pe
1
, Pu
1
, Pe
2
, Pu
2
and
two monitored statements S b
1
and S b
2
such that all the following is true:
1. S 1 = E(⊗(P
e
1
, Pu
1
)[S b
1
]) and S 2 = E(⊗(P
e
2
, Pu
2
)[S b
2
]),
2. V1 = V2 , W1 = W2 , L1 = L2 and (w1 ↓E) = (w2 ↓E),
3. ∀i ∈ {1, 2} : ∃ws
i
s.t. wi = (wi ↓E) ⊤ w
s
i
,
4. ∀x < V1 : σ1(x) = σ2(x),
5. ∀l < L1 : l ∈ λ1 ⇔ l ∈ λ2,
6. ∀L : ¬stops(Pe
1
) ∧ ¬stops(Pu
1
)⇔ ¬stops(Pe
2
) ∧ ¬stops(Pu
2
).
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The point 3 stated above and lemma A.5 imply that op equals ǫ.
Sub-case 2.a: S b
1
, ∅.
Equation (6), the conclusion ⊳2 of definition A.6 and lemma A.1 imply that
〈| ζ1  ⊗(P
e
1, P
u
1)[S
b
1] |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς′1, q
′
1)  E
−1(S ′1) |〉
Because of the sub-case hypothesis, the only possible rule for this evaluation step is (EM(O)-
BRANCHstep). Therefore,
〈| ζ1  S
b
1 |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς′1, q
′
1)  S
n
1 |〉 and S
′
1 = E(⊗(P
e
1, P
u
1)[S
n
1])
The following steps consist in proving that (ζ′
1
⊢ S ′
1
) ∼ (ζ2 ⊢ S 2).
The case hypothesis, definition A.2 and lemma A.5 imply:
V ′1 = V1,W
′
1 = W1 and L
′
1 = L1 (11)
∀x < modify(S 1) : σ
′
1(x) = σ1(x) (12)
∀l < needs(S 1) ∪ owns(S 1) : l ∈ λ
′
1 ⇔ l ∈ λ1 (13)
The first point of the definition of bi-similarity is trivial as S ′
1
= E(⊗(Pe
1
, Pu
1
)[S n
1
]) and S 2 =
E(⊗(Pe
2
, Pu
2
)[S b
2
]).
The case hypothesis combined with (11) imply
V ′1 = V2,W
′
1 = W2 and L
′
1 = L2
Lemma A.2 imply (w′
1
↓E) = (w1 ↓E). Therefore, the case 2 hypothesis “(w1 ↓E) = (w2 ↓E)”
implies (w′
1
↓E) = (w2 ↓E). This is the point (b) of the bi-similarity definition.
Let E′ be E(⊗(Pe
1
, Pu
1
)[]). S 1 is equal to E
′(S b
1
). As the case hypothesis imply w1 = (w1 ↓E
) ⊤ ws
1
, by definition (w1 ↓E′ ) = (w1 ↓E) ⊤. Lemma A.2 imply (w1 ↓E′ ) = (w
′
1
↓E′ ). By
definition of branching context of evaluation context, there exists ws
′
1
such that w′
1
= (w′
1
↓E′
) ws
′
1
. Therefore, there exists ws
′
1
such that w′
1
= (w′
1
↓E) ⊤ w
s′
1
. This is sufficient to trivially
prove the point (c) of the bi-similarity definition.
Equation (11) implies that all x not in V ′
1
is not in V1. Definition A.2 implies that all x not
belonging to V1 does not belongs to modify(S 1). Therefore, (12) implies the point (d) of the
bi-similarity definition.
Similarly, (13) implies the point (e) of the bi-similarity definition.
Point (f) of the bi-similarity definition follows directly from the case hypothesis.
Therefore,
(ζ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1(ı)) ∼ (ζ2 ⊢ Θ2(ı))
and, following a proof similar to the one used in the sub-case 1.a,
(ϑ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1) ∼ (ϑ
′
2 ⊢ Θ
′
2)
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Sub-case 2.b: S b
1
= ∅.
Equation (6), the conclusion ⊳2 of definition A.6 and lemma A.1 imply that
〈| ζ1  ⊗(P
e
1, P
u
1)[S
b
1] |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς′1, q
′
1)  E
−1(S ′1) |〉
Because of the sub-case hypothesis, the only possible rule for this evaluation step is (EM(O)-
BRANCHexit). Therefore, with ṽ = modify(P
e
1
)∪modify(Pu
1
) and l̃ = needs(Pe
1
)∪ needs(Pu
1
),
S ′1 = E(∅) and ς
′
1 = ς1 (14)
¬stops(Pe1) and ¬stops(P
u
1) (15)
V ′1 = V1 , W
′
1 = W1 \ ṽ , L
′
1 = L1 \ l̃ and w
′
1 = (w1 ↓E) (16)
Equation (15), the case hypothesis and definition A.2 imply ¬stops(S b
2
). The case hypothesis
and definition A.2 imply ∀l ∈ (needs(S b
2
) \ owns(S b
2
)) : l < λ2. Therefore, lemma A.6 implies
that there exists a monitored execution state ζ t
2
such that:
〈| ζ2 ⊢ S 2 |〉
ǫ
−→⋆
M
〈| ζ t2 ⊢ E(⊗(P
e
2, P
u
2)[∅]) |〉
Let E′ be E(⊗(Pe
2
, Pu
2
)[]). The previous derivation, the case hypothesis and lemma A.5 imply
V t2 = V2 , W
t
2 = W2 , L
t
2 = L2 and (w
t
2 ↓E′ ) = (w2 ↓E′ ),
∀x < modify(S 2) : σ
t
2(x) = σ2(x),
∀l < needs(S 2) ∪ owns(S 2) : l ∈ λ
t
2 ⇔ l ∈ λ2.
Therefore, the case hypothesis implies:
V t1 = V
t
2 , W
t
1 = W
t
2 , L
t
1 = L
t
2 and (w
t
1 ↓E) = (w
t
2 ↓E)
∀i ∈ {1, 2} : ∃wti s.t. w
t
i = (w
t
i ↓E) ⊤ w
t
i
∀x < V t1 : σ
t
1(x) = σ
t
2(x)
∀l < Lt1 : l ∈ λ
t
1 ⇔ l ∈ λ
t
2
Then, by applying the rule (EM-BRANCHexit) to E(⊗(P
e
2
, Pu
2
)[∅]), we get that there exists ζ′
2
such that
〈| ζ2 ⊢ S 2 |〉
ǫ
−→⋆
M
〈| ζ′2 ⊢ S
′
1 |〉
and
V ′1 = V
′
2 , W
′
1 = W
′
2 , L
′
1 = L
′
2 and w
′
1 = w
′
2
∀x < V ′1 : σ
′
1(x) = σ
′
2(x)
∀l < L′1 : l ∈ λ
′
1 ⇔ l ∈ λ
′
2
Therefore S ′
1
= S ′
2
and ζ′
1
 ζ′
2
.
Following a proof similar to the one used in the sub-case 1.a, we can conclude that:
(ϑ′1 ⊢ Θ
′
1) ∼ (ϑ
′
2 ⊢ Θ
′
2)

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A.2 Partial Transparency
A.2.1 Definitions
γ ⊢E skip : τ cmd
(TE-SKIP)
γ(e) ≤ γ(x) τ ≤ γ(x)
γ ⊢E x := e : τ cmd
(TE-ASSIGN)
γ(e) ≤ L
γ ⊢E output e : L cmd
(TE-OUTPUT)
γ ⊢E S
h : τ cmd γ ⊢E S
t : τ cmd
γ ⊢E S
h ; S t : τ cmd
(TE-SEQ)
γ(e) ≤ τ′ γ ⊢E S
true : τ′ cmd γ ⊢E S
false : τ′ cmd τ ≤ τ′
γ ⊢E if e then S
true else S false end : τ cmd
(TE-IF)
γ(e) ≤ L γ ⊢E S
l : L cmd
γ ⊢E while e do S
l done : L cmd
(TE-WHILE)
γ(e) ≤ L γ ⊢E S
s : L cmd
γ ⊢E with x̄ when e do S
s done : L cmd
(TE-SYNC)
γ ⊢E ∅ : τ cmd
(TE-NOC)
γ ⊢E S : L cmd
γ ⊢E ⊙ x̄[S ] : L cmd
(TE-LOCKED)
γ ⊢E P
e : τ′ cmd γ ⊢E P
u : τ′ cmd
γ ⊢E S
b : τ′ cmd τ ≤ τ′
γ ⊢E ⊗ (P
e, Pu)[S b] : τ cmd
(TE-BRANCHED)
Figure 11: The extended type system used for monitored statements.
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An extended type system for monitored statements is given in Figure 11.
strip() takes into parameter a monitored statements and returns an execution statement.
strip(∅) = ∅
strip(x := e) = x := e
strip(output e) = output e
strip(skip) = skip
strip(if e then S 1 else S 2 end) = if e then strip(S 1) else strip(S 2) end
strip(while e do S done) = while e do strip(S ) done
strip(with x̄ when e do S done) = with x̄ when e do strip(S ) done
strip(S 1 ; S 2) = strip(S 1) ; strip(S 2)
strip(⊙x̄[S ]) = ⊙x̄[strip(S )]
strip(⊗(P1, P2)[S ]) = strip(S )
A.2.2 Lemmas
Lemma A.9. For all monitored statements S and typing environments γ, if “γ ⊢E S : H cmd” then
∀x ∈ modify(S ). γ(x) = H, needs(S ) = ∅ and ¬stops(S ).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation tree of the typing judgment and follows directly
from the definitions of the different functions. 
Lemma A.10. For all monitored statements S , execution statements S ′u, execution states (σ, λ) and
(σ′, λ′), automaton states (V,W, L,w), typing environments γ, and types τ if:
⋆1 ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) ⊢ S ,
⋆2 ∀x ∈ V, γ(x) = H,
⋆3 L = ∅,
⋆4 w < {⊥}
⋆ ⇒ τ = H,
⋆5 γ ⊢E S : τ cmd,
⋆6 〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ strip(S ) |〉
o
−→
S
〈| (σ′, λ′) ⊢ S ′u |〉 ,
then there exists an automaton state (V ′,W ′, L′,w′), a monitored statement S ′m, and a type τ
′ such that:
• 〈| ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w))  S |〉
o
−→⋆
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′), (V ′,W ′, L′,w′))  S ′m |〉 ,
• ∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H,
• L′ = ∅,
• w′ < {⊥}⋆ ⇒ τ′ = H,
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• γ ⊢E S
′
m : τ
′ cmd,
• S ′u = strip(S
′
m).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation tree of the global hypothesis ⋆5. If the last typing
rule used is:
(TE-NOC) then we can conclude that the lemma is vacuously true as the global hypothesis ⋆6 does not
hold.
(TE-SKIP) then we can conclude that the lemma is true as the monitored or unmonitored execution of
skip only replace it by ∅.
(TE-ASSIGN) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “x := e”.
It follows directly from the typing rule.
(2) there exists an automaton state (V ′,W ′, L′,w′) such that W ′ = W, L′ = L, w′ = w, and:
〈| ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w))  S |〉
ǫ
−→⋆
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′), (V ′,W ′, L′,w′))  ∅ |〉
It follows directly from the rule (EM-OK) as the security automaton always validate the exe-
cution of assignments.
(3) ∀y ∈ V ′, γ(y) = H.
Case 1: x < W and FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
(a) V ′ ⊆ V .
It follows directly from the case hypothesis and the rule (T-ASSIGN-pub).
(◦) ∀y ∈ V ′, γ(y) = H.
It follows from the local conclusion (a) and the global hypothesis ⋆2.
Case 2: x ∈ W.
(a) x ∈ V .
It follows directly from the case hypothesis and the global hypothesis ⋆1.
(◦) ∀y ∈ V ′, γ(y) = H.
It follows from the local conclusion (a) and the global hypothesis ⋆2.
Case 3: FV(e) ∩ V , ∅.
(a) V ′ = V ∪ {x}.
It follows directly from the case hypothesis and the rule (T-ASSIGN-sec).
(b) γ(x) = H.
Because of the case hypothesis, there exists a variable z in FV(e) such that z ∈ V .
The global hypothesis ⋆2 implies that γ(z) = H. Then, the global hypothesis ⋆5 and
the typing rule (TE-ASSIGN) imply that γ(x) = H.
(◦) ∀y ∈ V ′, γ(y) = H.
It follows from the global hypothesis ⋆2 and the local conclusions (a) and (b).
(•) the lemma holds.
If follows directly from the local conclusions (2) and (3), the global hypotheses ⋆3 and ⋆4,
and the typing rule (TE-NOC).
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(TE-OUTPUT) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “output e”, γ(e) = L, and τ = L It follows directly from the rule (TE-OUTPUT).
(2) w ∈ {⊥}⋆ and FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
The global hypothesis ⋆4 and the local conclusion (1) imply w ∈ {⊥}
⋆. The global hypothe-
sis ⋆?? and the local conclusion (1) imply FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
(3) the following is true:
〈| ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w))  S |〉
o
−→⋆
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′), (V,W, L,w))  ∅ |〉
It follows directly from the rule (EM-OK) and the local conclusion (2).
(•) the lemma holds.
If follows directly from the local conclusions (3), the global hypotheses ⋆??, ⋆3 and ⋆4, and
the typing rule (TE-NOC).
(TE-SEQ) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “S h ; S t” and:
• γ ⊢ S h : τ cmd,
• γ ⊢ S t : τ cmd.
It follows directly from the rule (TE-SEQ).
(•) the lemma holds.
From the inductive hypothesis, the lemma holds for S h. Therefore, from the rules for moni-
tored and unmonitored executions, both executions evaluate the same way.
(TE-IF) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “if e then S true else S false end” and there exists a type τ′ such that γ(e) ≤ τ′ and:
• γ ⊢ S true : τ′ cmd,
• γ ⊢ S f alse : τ′ cmd.
It follows directly from the rule (TE-IF).
(2) FV(e) ∩ V = ∅ or needs(S true) ∪ needs(S false) = ∅.
If FV(e) ∩ V , ∅ then there exists a variable z in FV(e) such that z ∈ V . The global hypothe-
sis ⋆2 implies that γ(z) = H. Then γ(e) = H. Therefore, lemma A.9 and the local conclusion
(1) imply needs(S true) = needs(S false) = ∅
(3) FV(e) ∩ V , ∅ implies that both S true and S f alse can be typed as H cmd with the typing envi-
ronment γ.
If FV(e) ∩ V , ∅ then there exists a variable z in FV(e) such that z ∈ V . The global hypoth-
esis ⋆2 implies that γ(z) = H. Then γ(e) = H and the desired result follows from the local
conclusion (1).
(•) the lemma holds.
From the local conclusion (2), one of the two transitions (T-BRANCH-low) or (T-BRANCH-
high) applies. Therefore, the monitored execution evaluates similarly to the unmonitored
execution. Additionally, lemma A.9, the global hypotheses and the local conclusion (3) imply
the remaining global conclusions.
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(TE-WHILE) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “while e do S l done”, γ(e) = L, τ = L and γ ⊢ S l : L cmd. It follows directly from the
rule (TE-WHILE).
(2) FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
If FV(e) ∩ V , ∅ then there exists a variable z in FV(e) such that z ∈ V . The global hy-
pothesis ⋆2 implies that γ(z) = H. Then γ(e) = H, which is in contradiction with the local
conclusion (1).
(•) the lemma holds.
From the local conclusion (2), the transition (T-BRANCH-low) applies. Therefore, the mon-
itored execution evaluates similarly to the unmonitored execution. Additionally, the global
hypotheses and local conclusion (1) imply the remaining global conclusions.
(TE-SYNC) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “with x̄ when e do S s done”, γ(e) = L, τ = L and γ ⊢ S s : L cmd. It follows directly from
the rule (TE-SYNC).
(2) FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
If FV(e) ∩ V , ∅ then there exists a variable z in FV(e) such that z ∈ V . The global hy-
pothesis ⋆2 implies that γ(z) = H. Then γ(e) = H, which is in contradiction with the local
conclusion (1).
(•) the lemma holds.
From the local conclusion (2), the transition (T-SYNC) applies. Therefore, the monitored ex-
ecution evaluates similarly to the unmonitored execution. Additionally, the global hypotheses
and local conclusion (1) imply the remaining global conclusions.
(TE-LOCKED) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “⊙x̄[S s]”, τ = L and γ ⊢ S s : L cmd. It follows directly from the rule (TE-SYNC).
(•) the lemma holds.
From the rules of both semantics for locked statements, the monitored execution evaluates
similarly to the unmonitored execution. Additionally, the global hypotheses and local con-
clusion (1) imply the remaining global conclusions.
(TE-BRANCHED) then we can conclude that :
(1) S is “⊗(Pe, Pu)[S b]” and there exist a type τ′ such that:
• τ ≤ τ′
• γ ⊢ S b : τ′ cmd.
It follows directly from the rule (TE-SYNC).
(2) strip(S ) = strip(S b).
It follows directly from the definition of strip().
(3) S b , ∅.
Otherwise, the global hypothesis ⋆6 does not hold.
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(•) the lemma holds.
From the local conclusions (1) and (2), the lemma holds for S b, and from the local conclusion
(3), rule (EM-BRANCHstep) applies to S . Therefore, the lemma holds.

Lemma A.11. For all monitored statements S and S ′, execution states (σ, λ) and (σ′, λ′), automaton
states (V,W, L,w) and (V ′,W ′, L′,w′), typing environments γ, and types τ if:
⋆1 ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w)) ⊢ S ,
⋆2 ∀x ∈ V, γ(x) = H,
⋆3 L = ∅,
⋆4 w < {⊥}
⋆ ⇒ τ = H,
⋆5 γ ⊢E S : τ cmd,
⋆6 〈| ((σ, λ), (V,W, L,w))  S |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′), (V ′,W ′, L′,w′))  S ′ |〉 ,
then there exists a type τ′ such that:
• 〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ strip(S ) |〉
o
−→⋆
S
〈| (σ′, λ′) ⊢ strip(S ′) |〉 ,
• ∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H,
• L′ = ∅,
• w′ < {⊥}⋆ ⇒ τ′ = H,
• γ ⊢E S
′ : τ′ cmd.
Proof. The proof is similar to lemma A.10; however more simple. 
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